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INTRODUCTION

Land use litigation pervades the dockets of state and federal courts. State
supreme courts, for instance, routinely confront critical issues of constitutional
principle, including the scope of governmental power to take private property. 1
But state supreme courts also hear mundane disputes between landowners and
municipalities about excessive pet-keeping,2 inadequate setbacks,3 and docks
that interfere with the views of neighbors. 4 In a culture as litigious as ours, it
should not be surprising that landowners or their neighbors sue municipalities
when they are aggrieved by land use decisions. What is remarkable is that so
many controversies - major and minor - are litigated to final judgment, and
often reach appellate courts. In a universe where the overwhelming majority
of cases filed end with settlement rather than judgment, land use cases tend not
to settle.
Settling a land use case is difficult for a variety of reasons. First, unlike
civil actions in which plaintiff seeks a sum of money from defendant, land use
cases do not typically present an unlimited array of obvious compromise
solutions. If a landowner wants a variance to permit construction of two
homes on a lot zoned for one, there is little middle ground for settlement of
litigation resulting from the municipality's decision on the permit. Second,
because municipal officials are politically accountable to their constituents,
they may choose to avoid the political heat they would generate by settling
with an unpopular developer - preferring to hide behind judicial resolution of
controversial issues. Legal doctrine bears little responsibility for either of
these settlement obstacles; legal rules have little effect on the number of
compromise solutions or the political instinct to avoid controversial decisions.
Legal doctrine, however, does bear a close relation to other obstacles to
settlement of land use cases. Broad standing rules often permit neighbors,
community groups, and other governmental entities to challenge any

1

See, e.g., Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 170-72 (N.Y.
2009).
2 See Luper v. City of Wasilla, 215 P.3d 342, 344 (Alaska 2009).
3 Moon v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Madison, 966 A.2d 722, 725-27 (Conn. 2009).
4
Hitch v. Vasarhelyi, 680 S.E.2d 411 , 412 (Ga. 2009).
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settlement. 5 Zoning law also provides a variety of grounds, both procedural
and substantive, on which to attack any settlement. 6
Suppose a municipality rezones property over the objection of an affected
landowner, or denies the landowner a special permit or a variance. If the
landowner then brings an action against the municipality challenging the
municipality's decision, what power does the municipality's counsel have to
settle the litigation? The municipality will typically have to offer one of two
concessions to settle: money paid to the plaintiff landowner or some relaxation
of the use restrictions imposed on the plaintiff landowner's land. The structure
of zoning law does not limit the municipality's power to make payments to the
landowner, but it does inhibit the municipality's power to make a settlement
offer that changes the restrictions imposed on plaintiffs land.
First, in many jurisdictions, any settlement will require the formal approval
of one or more municipal bodies. 7 Whether the settlement requires the local
legislative body to amend the zoning ordinance, a zoning board of appeals to
issue a special permit or variance, or a local planning board to issue site plan
approval, these formal approvals will typically involve public hearings and
ultimately a public vote. In many jurisdictions, the approval will also require
the approving body to make findings to support its determination.
Second, even if the settlement receives formal approval, neighbors may
have standing to challenge that approval. 8 The challenge might rest on
procedural grounds if the approving body has departed from statutory
procedures in order to expedite the settlement. But even if the approving body
has dotted all of its i's and crossed all of its t's, neighbors might be able to
challenge the approval on substantive grounds, contending that the approval
constituted "spot zoning" or was arbitrary or capricious in violation of state
law, or on a variety of other grounds. 9
The prospect of further municipal approvals and neighbor litigation reduces
the attractiveness of settlement to developers.
From the developer's
perspective, time is money, and a principal reason to settle pending litigation is
to speed up the development process. To the extent that these structural
hurdles entail delay, they make litigation to judgment relatively more attractive
5

See, e.g., 120 W. Fayette St., LLLP v. Mayor of Baltimore, 964 A.2d 662, 672-73 (Md.
2009) (concluding that a landowner in close proximity to development has standing to
challenge land use decision and that the municipality has the burden of proving that a
landowner in close proximity is not aggrieved for standing purposes); Save the Pine Bush,
Inc. v. Common Council of Albany, 918 N.E.2d 917, 918, 921 (N.Y. 2009) (ruling that even
persons who do not own land in close proximity and the organizations to which they belong
have standing to challenge land use decision that would affect a natural resource if the
landowner or organization "can prove that he or she uses and enjoys a natural resource more
than most other members of the public").
6
See infra Part I.
1 See infra Part I.B.2.
8
See infra Part I.A.
9
See infra Part I.B.3.
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than settlement. Compared to settlements, judgments will typically provide
more insulation from neighbor challenges.
From the perspective of the parties in the midst of litigation, this appears to
be a lose-lose situation. Both the municipality and the developer would prefer
to settle the litigation on terms that reduce the impact of the proposed
development rather than incurring the costs, risks, and delays inherent in
continuing to litigate. 10 Even the neighbors (who are also municipal taxpayers)
will often benefit from a settlement rather than continued litigation that could
result in a complete victory for the developer. From this perspective,
streamlining the settlement process to overcome structural obstacles would
appear to be an attractive reform.
There is, however, another side to the story. The doctrines that interfere
with settlement may also serve significant land use objectives. First, they
might discipline municipal officials, reducing the risk of regulatory capture by
developers II or neighbors. 12 Second, some of these doctrines - particularly

10

Moreover, settlement may avoid social costs - of providing judges and courtrooms as well as private costs to the litigant. See Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why
Encourage Settlement, and Why Permit Non-Party Involvement in Settlements?, 75 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 221 , 259 (1999); Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the
Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 602-04
(1997).
On the other hand, when cases are litigated to judgment, the resulting precedent may
reduce legal uncertainty, and therefore the volume of future controversies, a benefit parties
are not likely to factor into their settlement calculus. Similarly, litigation to judgment may
assist in the development of social norms. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE
L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) (comment) (emphasizing the role of courts in giving effect to public
values). Shavell, however, suggests that these benefits of litigation are overstated because,
in a world where so few cases go to trial, the marginal social value of an additional trial for
law clarification or norm development is likely to be small. See Shaven, supra, at 595-96,
606.
11
Neighbor standing, public hearing requirements, and doctrines that give neighbors a
cause of action against the municipality make it more difficult for municipal officials to
capitulate to the demands of politically influential developers.
12
In the absence of structural obstacles to settlement, one might fear that municipalities
would enact regulations designed to not take account of externalities a proposed
development might produce, but instead to extract public benefits unrelated to those
externalities - a practice the Supreme Court tried to limit in No/Ian v. California Coastal
Commission, 483 U.S. 825 , 838-42 (1987) (holding that an easement condition placed on a
beachfront property owner' s permit - designed to provide lateral access across the beach exceeded the coastal commission ' s power because the condition was unrelated to the
justification for requiring the permit). Consider Trancas Property Owners Ass 'n v. City of
Malibu, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 200 (Ct. App. 2006), in which the court set aside a settlement
agreement at the behest of objecting neighbors. Id. at 202. After about twenty years of
unsuccessful efforts to obtain approval of a subdivision, the developer sued to enjoin the
city from disapproving subdivision maps filed by the developer. Id. at 202-03 . While the
litigation was pending, the city and the developer "agreed to settle" the litigation on terms
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public hearing and environmental review requirements - may operate to
generate information that improves the quality of land use decisions. Third,
the same doctrines that increase the information available to decision makers
may also operate to promote participation in the land use process, generating
greater public acceptance of controversial decisions.
These defenses of doctrines that make settlement difficult do not, however,
rely on the importance of judicial resolution of land use controversies. Judicial
review (or the prospect of judicial review) may increase the likelihood that
municipal officials will better identify and account for the interests of parties
affected by controversial land use decisions. But as long as final judicial
resolution of land use disputes is not an end in itself, it should be possible to
streamline doctrine to permit easier, quicker, and cheaper settlement without
sacrificing the quality or legitimacy of land use decisions.
Part I of this Article explores the obstacles to settlement presented by
current legal doctrine. Part II demonstrates that those obstacles serve few
critical functions within the traditional "plan" model of land use regulation or
within a public choice model of land use regulation. By contrast, they do play
a significant role within a more modem model that treats municipal officials as
mediators of land use conflicts. Part III examines alternatives to the current
approach, and suggests that a regime that bars potential objectors from
challenging a settlement unless they participated in the litigation that generated
the settlement would retain the primary advantages of current restrictions on
settlement - without the current costs.

I. THE DOCTRINAL PROBLEM
A concrete example illustrates the doctrinal issues surrounding settlement of
zoning litigation. Consider a variant on the facts of Westchester Day School v.
Village of Mamaroneck, 13 decided by the Second Circuit in 2007. A private

that required the developer to dedicate to the city 26.5 acres in exchange for approval of a
map permitting 32 units on the developer's remaining 8.5 acres. Id. at 204. If the city had
imposed the dedication of 26.5 acres as a condition of obtaining development approvals, the
city's exaction would have required both a "nexus" to the reasons for withholding
development approval and "rough proportionality" to the harms the development might
impose on the community. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) ("[A] term
such as 'rough proportionality' best encapsulates what we hold to be the requirement ....
No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some sort of
individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent
to the impact of the proposed development."); Nol/an, 483 U.S. at 837 ("[T]he lack ofnexus
between the condition and the original purpose of the building restriction converts that
purpose to something other than what it was. The purpose then becomes, quite simply, the
obtaining of an easement to serve some valid governmental purpose, but without payment of
compensation."). But if the Trancas court had held the settlement binding, the city would
have escaped the need to satisfy the standards articulated in Nol/an and Dolan.
13
504 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 2007).
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Orthodox Jewish day school sought to expand its operation. 14 Under the
village zoning ordinance, the expansion required a special permit from the
village's zoning board of appeals, an administrative body empowered to
consider applications for variances and special permits. 15 Westchester Day
School applied for the permit, 16 and provided the requisite notice to
neighboring landowners.17 Many neighbors expressed their opposition to the
proposed expansion. 18 The zoning board of appeals denied the permit, citing
traffic and other concerns. 19
Westchester Day School then brought an action in federal district court,
contending that the permit denial violated both the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) 20 and state law. 21 The action sought
the permit, damages, and attorneys' fees. 22
Suppose the village attorney, faced with this action, consulted with the
village board of trustees, the village's elected governing body, and suggested
that settlement would be in the village's interest. 23 Suppose further that she
proposed offering to permit the day school to complete a somewhat modified
expansion in return for dropping all claims against the village. Suppose also
that both the village board of trustees and the day school found the terms of the
proposed settlement more attractive than continuing the litigation. Would the
parties settle?

14

Id. at 344-45.
Id. at 344.
16
Id. at 345.
17 See Westchester Day Sch. v. Viii. of Mamaroneck, 417 F. Supp. 2d 477, 510
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
18
Id. at 510-11.
19 Westchester Day Sch., 504 F.3d at 346.
20 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2006) (protecting freedom of religion in prisons and
under zoning laws).
21 The procedural history of the case was, in fact, somewhat more complicated. The Day
School initially brought suit challenging the zoning board of appeals issuance of a "positive
declaration" under the state's environmental statute, which would have required preparation
ofan environmental impact statement. Westchester Day Sch., 417 F. Supp. 2d at 512. That
challenge was premised both on RLUIPA and on state law. Id. at 483 . When the village
subsequently denied the permit application, the Day School amended its complaint to focus
on RLUIPA and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006) (authorizing federal courts to
"issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions").
Westchester Day Sch., 504 F.3d at 346.
22
See Westchester Day Sch., 417 F. Supp. 2d at 572-73 (ordering board to issue the
permit, but reserving judgment on "plaintiff's prayer for damages and attorneys' fees
pending appellate review").
23 In fact, the village ultimately settled with the Day School after the Second Circuit's
decision, agreeing to pay the school $4.75 million to avoid a potential damage award that
could have been significantly higher. Juli S. Charkes, Mamaroneck and School Settle
Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2008, at WE2.
15
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Prevailing models of the settlement process assume that settlement costs are
typically lower than litigation costs, and that parties generally settle disputes
unless their estimates of the likely litigation outcomes are widely disparate. 24
Of course, as the cost of settlement rises relative to the cost of litigation, the
parties to a dispute become more likely to litigate, even if their estimates of
litigation success are similar. 25 At the limit, if settlement costs exceed
litigation costs, risk neutral parties generally should litigate rather than settle
even if they have identical estimates of the litigation outcome.26
From the perspective of the day school, two potential settlement costs might
make litigation look attractive, even if the parties shared similar assessments of
the litigation outcome. First, procedural requirements for finalizing the
settlement might entail delay. Second, any risk that the settlement would not
be enforceable increases the effective cost of settlement and makes settlement
less attractive. These costs, in turn, increase the concessions the day school
would want from the village before foregoing litigation, making settlement less
attractive to the village and its attorney.
These problems are far from hypothetical.27 Lake County Trust Co. v.
Advisory Plan Commission, 28 decided in 2009 by the Indiana Supreme Court,
furnishes a recent real-world illustration.
After the plan commission
disapproved a developer's subdivision application, the developer sought
judicial review. 29 The trial court, pursuant to Indiana's alternative dispute
resolution rules, ordered mediation of the dispute. 30 The plan commission
granted its lawyers full authority to settle the dispute,31 and the mediation
resulted in a written settlement that the commission agreed to approve at its

24

The classic treatment of settlement is George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The
Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). Priest and Klein assumed
explicitly that litigation costs are greater than settlement costs. Id. at 13. On their
assumptions, the likelihood that a dispute will be litigated increases when the difference in
the parties' probability estimates of the outcome of litigation increases. Id. at 16. As
another article puts it:
[S]ettlement efforts will fail, and adjudication will result, only when (1) the plaintiff
and defendant have different estimates of the expected value of litigation, (2) the
plaintiffs estimate is higher than the defendant's, and (3) the two estimates differ by
more than the combined transaction costs (and risk-aversion effects) of the parties.
Russell Korobkin, Aspirations and Settlement, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 8 (2002)
(summarizing the traditional approach to settlement).
25
See Priest & Klein, supra note 24, at 20.
26
See id.
27
For a case upsetting settlement of a RLUIPA challenge - much like the one in
Westchester Day School - see League ofResidential Neighborhood Advocates v. City ofLos
Angeles, 498 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2007), discussed infra text accompanying notes 74-79.
28
904 N.E.2d 1274 (Ind. 2009).
29
Id. at 1275.
30 Id.
31

Id. at 1279.
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next meeting. 32 Despite the agreement, the plan commission voted to defer
consideration of the subdivision, and ultimately rejected the plan. 33 After
deferral and before rejection, the developer filed a motion to enforce the
settlement agreement. 34 Ultimately, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the
commission lacked the power to delegate settlement authority to its lawyer
because Indiana law required final approval of any subdivision plat "by a
majority of the commission members at meetings subject to the Open Door
Law."35
Lake County Trust reduces the incentive for developers to mediate or settle
in Indiana, and similar decisions generate the same disincentives in other
states. 36 Lake County Trust involved the relatively unusual - but not unique situation in which the municipality reneged on its own agreement. The
problem is exacerbated in many jurisdictions because a variety of parties might
have standing to challenge the settlement on any of several different grounds.
This Section first examines standing to challenge a settlement, and turns then
to the grounds on which a settlement might be upset.
A.

Standing

Multiple parties may have standing to challenge a settlement. First, the
municipality itself may have standing to upset a settlement agreement. A
municipality may challenge a settlement when there has been a change in
municipal administration after the settlement, but a municipal challenge can
also arise when political pressure causes local officials to change their mind
about the wisdom of the settlement. For example, in Martin v. City of
Greenville, 37 the city and the landowner reached a compromise agreement
settling the landowner's action to declare the city's zoning ordinance
unconstitutional as applied to the landowner's parcel. 38 Subsequently, the
landowner sought to enforce the settlement agreement, but the city successfully
argued that the agreement was invalid because the city lacked legal authority to
make the agreement. 39

32

Id. at 1275 .
Id. at 1276.
34
Id. at 1275-76.
35 Id. at 1279. The Indiana Supreme Court vacated a lower court's award of sanctions
against the plan commission. Id. at 1275, 1280. The trial court, however, had ordered the
plan commission to approve the subdivision, and the commission did not appeal from that
aspect of the trial court's order. Id. at 1279 n.2. Nevertheless, the Indiana Supreme Court's
opinion, which permits a subsequent commission to renege on a negotiated or mediated
settlement without sanction, generates a disincentive to settlement in future cases.
36 See infra notes 37-90 and accompanying text.
37
369 N.E.2d 543 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977).
38 Id. at 544.
39 Id. at 546.
33
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Second, in some states local governmental authority is sufficiently
fragmented that even if the municipality's elected governing body agrees to
settle a land use dispute, another governmental body will have standing to
challenge the settlement. New York furnishes a prime example. In Commco,
Inc. v. Amelkin,40 the Court of Appeals held that a town's zoning board of
appeals - a body appointed by the elected town board - had standing to
challenge a stipulation of settlement authorized by the town board and entered
into by the town board's special counsel and the landowner. 41 The court
emphasized that the zoning board of appeals, whose variance denial had
triggered the litigation and subsequent settlement, "is a separate entity whose
members serve with statutory powers and for statutorily specified periods of
time."42 The court also rejected the town board's argument that giving the
zoning board of appeals control over litigation and settlement could force the
town board "to finance frivolous appeals . . . to the possible fiscal ruination of
the town. " 43
Third, neighbors often have standing to challenge settlements between the
municipality and a developer. In most jurisdictions, if a municipality grants a
variance44 or rezones land, 45 immediate neighbors have standing to challenge
the variance or the zoning amendment. Perhaps because of this established
40

465 N.E.2d 314 (N.Y. 1984).
Id. at 316-17. The dispute initially arose when the zoning board of appeals denied the
landowner's application for a use variance that would have permitted conversion of "an
abandoned school building into a home for senior citizens." Id. at 315. When the
landowner challenged the zoning board' s decision, the trial court annulled the variance
denial, and the town appealed. Id. While the case was on appeal, the town appointed
special counsel and authorized settlement discussions, which ultimately resulted in the
settlement. Id. at 315-16. The zoning board of appeals, whose determination the landowner
had challenged, was not a party to the stipulation of settlement. Id. at 316.
42 Id. at 317. The relevant statute - today and at the time of the court's decision - also
provides that the town board can only remove members of the zoning board of appeals after
a public hearing and for cause. N.Y. TOWN LAW§ 267(9) (McKinney Supp. 2010); see also
Commco, Inc., 465 N .E.2d at 317.
43
Id. at 316. Three judges dissented from the court' s conclusions. Id. at 319-22 (Meyer,
J. , dissenting) (arguing that the town board should not be deemed subordinate to the zoning
board on a procedural technicality). Other courts have suggested a similar result. Thus, in
Warner Co. v. Sutton, 644 A.2d 656 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994), a challenge to a
settlement brought by neighboring landowners, the court emphasized that the zoning board
was not a party to the suit, even though deviation from density standards are typically
granted by the zoning board. Id. at 664-65 .
44
See, e.g., John John, LLC v. Planning Bd. of Brookhaven, 790 N.Y.S.2d 500, 501-02
(App. Div. 2005) (holding that an adjacent landowner who raised concerns "within the zone
of interest to be protected" had standing to challenge the board's approval of a development
and variance).
45
See, e.g., Smith v. City of Papillion, 705 N.W.2d 584, 591 (Neb. 2005) (concluding
that an adjacent landowner has standing to object to rezoning if the landowner shows some
"special injury").
41
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doctrine, cases in which neighbors challenge settlement agreements rarely even
discuss the standing issue. Thus, in Trancas Property Owners Ass 'n v. City of
Malibu, 46 a California court, at the behest of a neighboring property owners
association, set aside a settlement agreement that would have permitted the
developer to build thirty-two homes while dedicating an adjacent tract to the
city. 47 Neither the developer, nor the trial court that upheld the agreement, nor
the appellate court that invalidated it, suggested that the association lacked
standing. 48 Even in cases where courts ultimately sustain a settlement against a
neighbor challenge, neighbor standing is often assumed.49
B.

Grounds for Upsetting a Settlement

Standing to challenge a settlement agreement would not, by itself, be a
significant obstacle to settlement if no grounds were available for upsetting the
settlement. Litigants have, however, successfully advanced a number of
grounds for upsetting settlements.
I.

Contract Zoning

When a municipality extracts concessions from a landowner in return for a
municipal promise to rezone land, a number of courts have invalidated the
resulting zoning amendment as impermissible "contract zoning." 50 Those
courts have articulated a number of reasons for the prohibition on contract
zoning. Some have invoked the "reserved powers" doctrine and argued that a
municipality may not contract away its power to legislate in the public
interest. 51 On this theory, a contract to rezone improperly constrains legislative
discretion. Other courts have focused instead on the theory that contract
zoning impermissibly applies special rules to benefit some developers, but not
others. 52

46

41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 200 (Ct. App. 2006).
Id. at 202, 204.
48 Id. at 200; see also League of Residential Neighborhood Advocates v. City of Los
Angeles, 498 F.3d 1052, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007); Chung v. Sarasota County, 686 So. 2d 1358,
1358-59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Warner, 644 A.2d at 658-59, 665-66.
49 See, e.g., Murphy v. City of W. Memphis, 101 S.W.3d 221, 222-25 (Ark. 2003);
Brownsboro Rd. Area Def., Inc. v. McClure, No. 2002-CA-002559-MR, 2004 WL 1909337,
at *1 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2004) (validating settlement agreement over the objections of a
neighborhood organization, a business, a church, and four individual residents who were
allowed to intervene in the original action "without conditions or limitations").
50 See, e.g., Hale v. Osborn Coal Enters., Inc., 729 So. 2d 853 , 855 (Ala. Civ. App.
1997); Dacyv. Viii. ofRuidoso, 845 P.2d 793 , 794, 798 (N.M. 1992).
51 See, e.g., Haas v. City of Mobile, 265 So. 2d 564, 566-67 (Ala. 1972) (dismissing
appellant's contract zoning argument because the zoning requirements did not "control or
embarrass the legislative prerogatives of the city").
52
See, e.g., Morgran Co. v. Orange County, 818 So. 2d 640, 642-43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2002) ("'[I]f each parcel of property were zoned on the basis of variables that could enter
47
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Almost all academics criticize contract zoning doctrine. 53 Scholars (and
practitioners) recognize that individually tailored "deals" are often the most
effective mechanism for harmonizing competing private interests. 54 And
scholars have also noted that courts have selectively enforced the prohibition
on contract zoning by developing fine (and often unsupportable) distinctions
between prohibited contract zoning and permitted conditional zoning.55
Although the prohibition on contract zoning generally appears to be losing
its doctrinal steam, 56 it remains a ground on which both neighbors and the
municipality itself can rely in seeking to invalidate agreements designed to
settle litigation between developers and the municipality. Thus, in Chung v.
Sarasota County, 57 an adjacent owner challenged a settlement agreement
reached by a landowner and the county in an action disputing the county's
refusal to rezone the landowner's parcel. 58 The settlement required the county
to rezone the property, subject to stipulations and conditions. 59 The court
agreed with the adjacent owner that the settlement was invalid, concluding that

into private contracts then the whole scheme and objective of community planning and
zoning would collapse."' (quoting Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86, 89 (Fla. 1956) (en
bane))); Dacy, 845 P.2d at 797 ("Enforcement of such a promise [to zone] allows a
municipality to circumvent established statutory requirements to the possible detriment of
affected landowners and the community as a whole.").
53 See, e.g., Shelby D. Green, Development Agreements: Bargained-For Zoning that is
Neither Illegal Contract nor Conditional Zoning, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 383, 407, 488, 496
(2004) (highlighting "murky and overlapping" judicial treatment of contract and conditional
zoning, and suggesting that development agreements - a form of land use bargaining should not be treated as invalid contract zoning); Stewart E. Sterk, Publicly Held Servitudes
in the New Restatement, 27 CONN. L. REv. 157, 172-74 (1994) (discussing the "incoherent
underpinnings" of contract zoning doctrine); Judith Welch Wegner, Moving Toward the
Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning, Development Agreements, and the Theoretical
Foundations of Government land Use Deals, 65 N.C. L. REv. 957, 979-80 (1987)
(criticizing tendency to apply labels, such as contract zoning, that "suggest a relevant
theoretical framework but serve primarily to describe ultimate outcomes"); Jennifer G.
Brown, Note, Concomitant Agreement Zoning: An Economic Analysis, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv
89, 96-97 (characterizing distinctions between contract and conditional zoning as
"distinctions without differences").
54
See, e.g., Green, supra note 53, at 489-96; Charles L. Siemon, Conditional Zoning in
Illinois: Beast or Beauty?, 15 N. lLL. U. L. REV 585, 609-10 (1995); Wegner, supra note 53 ,
at 984; Brown, supra note 53, at 110.
55 See, e.g., Green, supra note 53, at 407; Brown, supra note 53, at 96-97.
56
See David L. Callies & Julie A. Tappendorf, Unconstitutional Land Development
Conditions and the Development Agreement Solution: Bargaining/or Public Facilities After
Nollan and Dolan, 51 CASE W . RES. L. REV. 663, 675-76 (2001) ("It is unlikely that courts
will fall back on the reserved powers clause to invalidate development agreements .... ").
57
686 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
58 Id. at 1359.
59 Id.
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the county had "contracted away the exercise of its police power, which
constituted an ultra vires act." 60
In Attman/Glazer P.B. Co. v. Mayor of Annapolis, 61 the court held that a
municipality itself can invoke the prohibition on contract zoning to escape
from a settlement agreement. 62 The landowner brought an action challenging a
parking requirement imposed by the municipality as a condition for permitting
the landowner to make active use of basement space.63 The municipality and
the landowner settled the lawsuit, apparently on terms that reduced the
landowner's obligation to provide parking.64 The agreement also required
submission of a new application for a conditional use permit, allegedly as a
matter of form, but when the landowner filed the application, the city's
planning and zoning commission concluded that the proposed conditional use
of the premises was illegal. 65 In light of the commission's recommendation,
the city council held a new hearing and denied the application. 66 The
landowner sought enforcement of the agreement, 67 but the court held that the
city council had no authority to make the agreement, citing the "prohibition
against contracting away the exercise of the zoning power."68
2.

Failure to Comply with Statutory Procedures

State statutes typically surround the zoning process with procedural
safeguards. Before a municipal body may effect any sort of zoning change from a comprehensive rezoning to a minor variance - neighboring landowners
must generally receive notice of the proposed change.69 That notice is
typically followed by public hearings on the proposed change before the

60

Id. at 1360; see also Trancas Prop. Owners Ass'n v. City of Malibu, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d
200, 206 (Ct. App. 2006) (invalidating settlement agreement because "it includes
commitments to take or refrain from regulatory actions regarding the zoning of Trancas' s
development project, which may not lawfully be undertaken by contract"); cf BPG Real
Estate Investors-Straw Party II, L.P. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 990 A.2d 140, 143 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2010) (invalidating part of a settlement agreement because the court lacked power to
approve an agreement that permitted development of land that was not the subject of the
underlying litigation).
61 552 A.2d 1277 (Md. 1989).
62 Id. at 1284.
63 Id. at 1280.
64
There was a dispute about the precise terms of the agreement. Id. On the court' s view
that the municipality had no power to reduce parking requirements by contract, the precise
terms of the agreement were not critical. Id. at 1282.
65 Id. at 1280-81.
66
Id. at 1281.
67
Id. at 1281-82.
68
Id. at 1284.
69
See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65091 (West 2010) (requiring notice to owners of real
property "within 300 feet of the real property that is the subject of the hearing").
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designated municipal body votes on the change. 70 Some statutes provide an
opportunity for opponents to seek a public referendum on the change,7 1 while
other statutes require approval of the proposed change by multiple levels of
government. 72 Moreover, in an increasing number of states, significant zoning
changes require environmental review, which often entails time-consuming
preparation of an environmental impact statement, followed by public hearings
and fact-finding by the "lead agency" charged with evaluating environmental
impact. 73
These statutory mandates have provided fertile ground for challenge to
settlements that would result in a change in the permitted use of the land. The
Ninth Circuit's decision in League of Residential Neighborhood Advocates v.
City of Los Angeles74 furnishes a recent example. After the City of Los
Angeles denied a conditional use permit for operation of a synagogue in an
area zoned for residential uses, the congregation brought an action in federal
court alleging RLUIP A violations. 75 The city and the congregation settled the
action on terms that authorized use of the property for worship, subject to
various restrictions. 76 When neighbors brought an action contending that local
zoning ordinances denied the city authority to enter into the settlement
agreement, the Ninth Circuit agreed, emphasizing that the procedure for
reviewing conditional use permit applications requires public notice, a public
hearing, a series of factual findings, and potential administrative appeals. 77
The court held that the city could not allow a use for which the zoning
ordinance requires a conditional use permit unless the city complied with the
procedural formalities required by the ordinance. 78 Because the city did not
comply with those formalities, the settlement agreement was invalid and
unenforceable. 79

70

See, e.g., id. § 65856 (West 2009); id. § 65905 .
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43 , § 42 (2008), applied in LaBranche v. A.J. Lane &
Co., 537 N.E.2d I 19, I 19-20 (Mass. 1989).
72
See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW§ 239-m (McKinney 1999).
73 See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21006 (West 2007) (describing
environmental review process); N .Y . ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109 (McKinney Supp.
2010) (detailing process for preparation of environmental impact statement). See generally
Stewart E. Sterk, Environmental Review in the Land Use Process: New York's Experience
with SEQRA , 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 2041 (1992) (discussing the impact of environmental
review processes for land use review implemented in many states and, in particular, the
environmental review process in New York).
74
498 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2007).
15
Id. at 1054.
16 Id.
77
Id. at 1054, 1056.
78
Id. at 1056.
19
Id. ; see also Chung v. Sarasota County, 686 So. 2d 1358, 1360-61 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1996); Warner Co. v. Sutton, 644 A.2d 656, 664-65 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
71
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A settlement agreement is more likely to survive challenge by neighbors if
the agreement requires the developer to apply to the relevant municipal boards,
who will then satisfy all statutory requirements. 80 But, of course, such a
settlement agreement is of less value to the developer because of the
uncertainty and delay it entails. Moreover, some courts have suggested that
even a contingent settlement agreement would be invalid because of the
pressure municipal officials would feel to act in accordance with the settlement
agreement. 81
3.

Substantive Challenges to the Settlement Agreement

Because municipalities are not themselves sovereign entities, their power to
regulate land use, like most of their other powers, is rooted in state statutes and
constitutions. As a result, landowners or neighbors can challenge zoning
decisions made by the municipality's governing body as inconsistent with state
enabling legislation, even if the municipality has followed all statutory
procedures. In those states that have enacted a version of the Standard State
Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA), 82 landowners can challenge a regulation on the
ground that it fails to satisfy the statutory mandate that regulations be "[f]or the
purpose of promoting health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the
comrnunity" 83 or on the ground that the regulation is inconsistent with the
statutory directive that "regulations shall be made in accordance with a
comprehensive plan."84 Neighbors more often focus on the comprehensive
plan requirement. 85 A claim that the challenged regulation constitutes
impermissible "spot zoning"86 is a variant of the comprehensive plan claim.
80

See, e.g., Brownsboro Rd. Area Def., Inc. v. McClure, No. 2002-CA-002559-MR,
2004 WL 1909337, at *4 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2004).
81
See Chung, 686 So. 2d at 1360.
82 The SZEA was first published by the United States Department of Commerce in 1924
as a model for use by state legislatures seeking to confer on municipalities the power to
zone. STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT explanatory notes 1, 14 (Advisory Comm.
on Zoning, U.S. Dep't of Commerce rev. ed. 1926), reprinted in MODEL LAND DEY. CODE
210 app. A, at 210, 212 {Tentative Draft No. 1, 1968).
83 STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT§ 1 (Advisory Comm. on Zoning, U.S. Dep't
of Commerce rev. ed. 1926), reprinted in MODEL LAND DEY. CODE 210 app. A, at 212
(Tentative Draft No. I, 1968) (footnotes omitted). Courts also may invalidate regulations
that do not promote the health, safety, morals or general welfare on substantive due process
grounds. See, e.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188-89 (1928); Twigg v.
County of Will, 627 N.E.2d 742, 745-46 (111. App. Ct. 1994).
84 STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT§ 3 (Advisory Comm. on Zoning, U.S . Dep' t
of Commerce rev. ed. 1926), reprinted in MODEL LAND DEY. CODE 210 app. A, at 214-15
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 1968); see, e.g., Griswold v. City of Homer, 186 P.3d 558, 560
(Alaska 2008).
85 Neighbors typically challenge municipal decisions that relax regulations on a
landowner's parcel. Because the parcel remains subject to some regulation, and the
neighbors prefer the remaining restrictions to none, it typically will not be in the neighbor's
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Because most courts take a deferential approach to local zoning decisions,
comprehensive plan challenges and spot zoning challenges are generally
unsuccessful. 87
Resolution of the challenges, however, is often timeconsuming. Moreover, in states that take a less deferential approach to
piecemeal zoning changes, these challenges stand a reasonable chance of
success. 88
BPG Real Estate Investors-Straw Party II, L.P. v. Board of Supervisors8 9
illustrates the problem. A neighbor challenged a settlement agreement as
impermissible spot zoning. 90 Although an appellate court ultimately rejected
the neighbor's challenge on the merits, 91 the very fact that an appellate court
considered the issue demonstrates that spot zoning doctrine offers potential for
upsetting a settlement agreement.
Similarly, if a zoning amendment,
conditional use permit, or variance would be subject to invalidation on any
other substantive ground, it would appear that a settlement agreement
conferring comparable rights on a landowner should be subject to attack on the

interest to contend that the restrictions do not promote health, safety, morals, or general
welfare.
86 See, e.g., Little v. Winborn, 518 N.W.2d 384, 387-88 (Iowa 1994).
87
The tradition of deference to local zoning decisions started with Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), where Justice Sutherland wrote: "If the validity of
the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment
must be allowed to control." Id. at 388. For a more recent justification of judicial
deference, see Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 468-69 (7th Cir.
1988) (emphasizing electoral check on power oflocal zoning officials). For criticism of the
deferential approach, see, for example, Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the
Presumption of Constitutionality in Land-Use Law, 24 URB. LAW. 1, 1-3 (1992).
88 Illinois has often been cited as a state with a less deferential approach to local zoning
decisions. See Fred P. Bosselman, The Commodijication of "Nature's Metropolis": The
Historical Context of Illinois ' Unique Zoning Standards, 12 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 527, 528-30,
580-82 (1992) (explaining the principles on which Illinois courts repeatedly base land use
decisions, which do not always favor local governments). There are signs, however, that the
Illinois Supreme Court is becoming more deferential toward local zoning determinations.
See, e.g., Napleton v. Viii. of Hinsdale, 891 N.E.2d 839, 850-51 (Ill. 2008) (concluding that
language in prior cases requiring that zoning have a "substantial relation" to advancement of
public health, safety, morals or general welfare should not be read to require more than
rational basis scrutiny).
89
990 A.2d 140 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010).
90
Id. at 149-50. In BPG, after the landowner challenged conditions the board of
supervisors had imposed on the grant of a conditional use application, the court permitted a
neighbor to intervene. Id. at 143. The landowner and the board then negotiated a settlement
over the objection of the neighbor, and the trial court approved the settlement over a number
of objections advanced by the neighbors, including spot zoning and contract zoning
objections. Id. at 144. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court did upset the settlement
agreement in part, holding that the settlement impermissibly granted development approvals
for land not included within the scope of the landowner's initial application. Id. at 149.
91
Id. at 151.
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same ground. So long as a neighbor would have standing to challenge an
ordinary zoning action on a substantive ground, a change in the procedure by
which the municipality reached its decision would appear to have little bearing
on the merits of the substantive attack.
C.

Preclusion Principles

Courts do not invariably uphold the right of neighbors to challenge
settlements. Some courts have upheld settlements by holding that a neighbor's
failure to intervene in the action between the developer and the municipality
precludes the neighbor from challenging the settlement of that action. Thus, in
Cuson v. Tallmadge Charter Township, 92 the developer initially sought to
develop its parcel for multi-family residential use, and when the township
denied the developer's request to rezone for that purpose, the developer
brought an action accusing the township of exclusionary zoning. 93 That
litigation resulted in a consent judgment. 94 When residential neighbors sought
to vacate the consent judgment on the ground that it violated statutory
procedures, the court held that the neighbors' sole remedies were "political in
nature ... or through the timely intervention in prior proceedings. '"> 5 Because
the neighbors had not intervened in the initial proceeding that produced the
consent judgment, they were precluded from advancing a collateral attack on
that judgment.96
The Cuson approach presents some difficult (although not insurmountable)
conflicts with existing preclusion doctrine. Intervention is not generally
mandatory. 97 A party's failure to intervene in litigation that might affect its
92 No. 234157, 2003WL21108470 (Mich. Ct. App. May 15, 2003).
9Jld.at*l.
94 The consent judgment provided that the developer would sell part of its parcel to
another developer, who would build a power plant on the parcel. Id. By the terms of the
agreement, the township would treat that parcel as if it were zoned for industrial use (thus
permitting the power plant), even though it was not in fact zoned for such use. Id.
95 Id. at *4.
96 Id. at *5; see also Stranahan House, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 967 So. 2d 1121,
1126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that a neighboring property owner could not
challenge a consent final judgment because it did not intervene in the circuit court
proceedings); Summit Twp. Taxpayers Ass'n v. Summit Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 411 A.2d
1263, 1265 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980) (holding that objectors could not appeal a "final and
binding order" when they did not intervene in the prior appeal of the zoning decision).
97 In Chase National Bank v. City of Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431 (1934), Justice Brandeis
wrote:
The law does not impose upon any person absolutely entitled to a hearing the burden of
voluntary intervention in a suit to which he is a stranger. . . . Unless duly summoned to
appear in a legal proceeding, a person not a privy may rest assured that a judgment
recovered therein will not affect his legal rights.
Id. at 441 (footnote omitted). More recently, the Court cited the Brandeis excerpt with
approval in Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 763 (1989).
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interests does not generally preclude the party from asserting its legal rights in
a subsequent proceeding.98
This rule reflects the origins and development of intervention doctrine. 99 As
originally conceived in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a non-party had a
right to intervene only when the non-party's interests were inadequately
represented in the litigation and the non-party "[was or may have been] bound
by a judgment in the action." 100 The Supreme Court, however, construed the
original Rule 24 narrowly, noting that a person whose interests were not
adequately represented by existing parties to a litigation could never be bound
by the litigation, making it logically impossible for a proposed intervenor to
establish both that it was not adequately represented and that it would be bound
by an adverse judgment. 101 Although subsequent amendments to Rule 24
liberalized intervention doctrine, 102 they did not change the Supreme Court's
insistence that a non-party not adequately represented in a proceeding cannot

98

Chase Nat '! Bank, 291 U.S. at 441.
Intervention had its origins in equity and admiralty practice, and did not become
generally available in civil actions until promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Peter A. Appel, Intervention in Public Law Litigation: The En vironmental
Paradigm, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 215, 239-53 (2000).
ioo FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2) (1940) (amended 1946).
101
Sam Fox Publ'g Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 691 (1961). Sam Fox Publishing
involved an attempt by small music publishers to intervene as of right in a proceeding by the
federal government to modify an antitrust consent decree in a dispute with the American
Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP). Id. at 687. The Supreme Court
held that because the publishers would not be bound by the consent judgment, they had no
right to intervene: "We regard it as fully settled that a person whose private interests
coincide with the public interest in government antitrust litigation is nonetheless not bound
by the eventuality of such litigation, and hence may not, as of right, intervene in it." Id. at
689.
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Harlan, went on to address the logical problem:
[A]ppellants, however, face this dilemma: the judgment in a class action will bind only
those members of the class whose interests have been adequately represented by
existing parties to the litigation; yet intervention as of right presupposes that an
intervenor's interests are or may not be so represented. Thus appellants' argument as
to a divergence of interests between themselves and ASCAP proves too much, for to
the extent that it is valid appellants should not be considered as members of the same
class as the present defendants, and therefore are not "bound." On the other hand, if
appellants are bound by ASCAP' s representation of the class, it can only be because
that representation has been adequate, precluding any right to intervene. It would
indeed be strange procedure to declare, on one hand, that ASCAP adequately
represents the interests of the appellants and hence that this is properly a class suit, and
then, on the other hand, to require intervention in order to insure of this representation
in fact.
Id. at 691-92 (citation omitted).
102
See Appel, supra note 99, at 254-58.
99
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be bound by the results of that proceeding - even if the party would have been
entitled to intervene in the proceeding. 103
Rule 24 does not bind state courts like the court in Cuson. But, in Richards
v. Jefferson County, the Supreme Court cited the Due Process Clause, not the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as the basis for holding that a non-party to a
proceeding cannot be bound by the result of that proceeding. 104 The Due
Process Clause, of course, does bind state courts.
Nevertheless, the Federal Constitution almost certainly does not prevent the
state courts from barring neighbors from challenging a settlement if they
choose not to intervene in ongoing litigation. The Supreme Court has said that
in cases involving a public action that has only an indirect impact on an
individual's interests, "we may assume that the States have wide latitude to
establish procedures not only to limit the number of judicial proceedings that
may be entertained but also to determine whether to accord a taxpayer any
standing at all." 105 That latitude would appear to include a mandatory
intervention rule of the sort adopted by the court in Cuson. 106
Perhaps the bigger issue with the Cuson approach is not conceptual, but
practical.
In reducing the obstacles to settlement, the Cuson court
simultaneously undermined the doctrinal framework that required
municipalities to comply with statutory procedures before making zoning
changes. Parts II and III of this Article evaluate that tradeoff and potential
alternatives.

Impact on Settlement

D.

This discussion of doctrinal structure raises an obvious and important
question: how much impact has doctrinal structure had on settlement rates in
land use litigation? Unfortunately, the question admits of no easy answer. It is
easy to identify large numbers of low-value land use cases that make their way
to appellate courts. But state courts do not maintain reliable data from which
one could compare settlement rates in land use cases with settlement rates in
other litigation. First, most state systems do not maintain data on settlement

103

Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 800 n.5 (1996) (citing Chase Nat'/ Bank,
291 U.S. at 441, with apparent approval); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 763 (1989) ("[A]
party seeking a judgment binding on another cannot obligate that person to intervene; he
must be joined.").
104 Richards, 517 U.S. at 805 ("Because petitioners received neither notice of, nor
sufficient representation in, the Bedingfield litigation, that adjudication, as a matter of
federal due process, may not bind them and thus cannot bar them from challenging an
allegedly unconstitutional deprivation of their property.").
105
Id. at 803.
106
See Cuson v. Tallmadge Charter Twp., No. 234157, 2003 WL 21108470, at *4 (Mich.
Ct. App. May 15, 2003).
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rates. 107 Second, the data they do collect does not code zoning or land use
cases as a separate category. 108
Moreover, even if empirical work established that settlement rates are lower
in zoning and land use cases than in other categories of cases, doctrinal
structure might not explain the difference. For instance, agency costs might be
particularly high in zoning and land use cases. 109 Because land use disputes
are often hot-button political issues, local officials may prefer to blame courts
for unfavorable outcomes, even if their lawyers advise them ahead of time that
the prospect of municipal success is small. This agency cost problem may lead
officials to litigate cases to judgment even when settlement may ultimately be
in the interest of local residents.
Even in the absence of empirical data, however, both intuition and economic
analysis suggest that if a doctrinal model increases the cost of settlement to the
settling parties, the parties will be less likely to settle than if settlement
involved lower costs.
II.

INTEGRATING SETTLEMENT INTO PREVAILING MODELS OF LAND USE
LAW

Do doctrinal obstacles to settlement of land use litigation advance
significant policy objectives? The social benefits associated with litigation of
disputes (and conversely, with settlement of disputes) do not correlate perfectly
with the private benefits. 110 Even private litigation has the potential to
generate external benefits - development of precedent, 111 reinforcement of
norms, 112 and, in some cases, optimal deterrence. 113 The correlation of private
107
See Theodore Eisenberg, Use It or Pretenders Will Abuse It: The Importance of
Archival Legal Information, 75 UMKC L. REV. 1, 12 (2006).
108
The State Court Guide to Statistical Reporting, developed by the National Center for
State Courts' Court Statistics Project, divides civil cases into a number of subcategories for
reporting purposes. Zoning and land use cases would appear to fall into the more general
subcategory of"Administrative Agency." COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, STATE COURT GUIDE
TO STATISTICAL REPORTING 11 (2009), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/d_researc
h/csp/CSPStatisticsGuidev 1.3 .pdf.
109
See Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 404-10 (1977) (discussing options facing municipal officials
concerned about re-election possibilities); Stewart E. Sterk, Nollan, Henry George, and
Exactions, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1731, 1736-42 (1988) (discussing the difficulty municipal
officials face in aggregating preferences).
110
Shaven, supra note 10, at 577.
111
John Bronsteen, Some Thoughts About the Economics of Settlement, 78 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1129, 1134 (2009); Lederman, supra note 10, at 258-59; Shaven, supra note IO, at
595-96 (discussing "amplification of law," which occurs "through its interpretation and the
setting of precedents").
112
Fiss, supra note 10, at I 085.
113 Shavell, supra note 10, at 578. Of course, as Shaven notes, there may also be cases in
which private litigation generates more litigation than would be socially optimal. Id.
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and social benefits becomes even more complex with public law litigation. 114
When government officials are on one side of a litigation, one might ideally
expect those public officials to account for all of the social costs and benefits
of litigating rather than settling. But, of course, most separation of powers
principles operate on the assumption that no single official, and no single
branch of government, will adequately account for social costs and benefits.
Almost nowhere is that more true than in the process of land use regulation.
Although local governments play the primary role both in enacting land use
regulations and in enforcing them, state law constrains the regulatory power of
local officials. State statutes typically impose on localities a format for local
regulation, often mandating a particular planning process, 115 requiring public
hearings, 116 and limiting the availability of administrative relief. 117
Land use scholars have developed a number of models to rationalize this
pattern of checks and balances on local decision makers. None of these
models has focused explicitly on the power of municipal officials to settle land
use litigation. But each model provides a context for evaluating the wisdom of
doctrinal restraints on settlement of litigation. This Section examines the role
settlement might play in each of three models of land use regulation.

The "Plan" Model

A.

Although it has fallen from academic favor during the last quarter
century, 118 the "plan" model of land use control was prevalent from zoning's

114

Owen Piss observed that within any organization, the formal procedures for
identifying who can make decisions on behalf of the organization are imperfect in assessing
the interests of the persons bound by those decisions. Piss, supra note 10, at 1078. But Piss
emphasized that when governmental entities are involved, the procedures for generating
authoritative consent to a settlement are "far cruder." Id. at 1079. Moreover, in the case of
groups who bring much public law litigation, the procedures are often non-existent. Id. at
1079-81.
115
See, e.g., N.Y. TOWN LAW§ 272-a (McKinney 2004).
116 See, e.g., id. § 272-a(6).
117
See, e.g., id. § 267-b (imposing the framework the board of appeals must use in
evaluating applications for use variances and area variances); Cohen v. Bd. of Appeals of
Saddle Rock, 795 N.E.2d 619, 621 , 624 (N.Y. 2003) (holding that state standards preempt
inconsistent local regulations, and overturning the grant of administrative relief as
inconsistent with statutory requirements).
118
Carol Rose 's 1983 assault on what she called "plan jurisprudence" marked a
significant departure from prior academic work, which had criticized the practice of
piecemeal zoning changes. Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land
Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 837, 841-46 (1983). For
earlier work focusing on the evil of piecemeal changes, see, for example, Jesse Dukeminier,
Jr. & Clyde L. Stapleton, The Zoning Board ofAdjustment: A Case Study in Misrule, 50 KY.
L.J. 273, 330-35, 349-50 (1962). For the classic article seeking to breathe life into the
requirement in the SZEA that zoning be in accordance with a comprehensive plan, see
Charles M. Haar, "In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan ", 68 HARV. L. REv. 1154
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inception through much of the Twentieth Century. As a result, the model
shaped and continues to shape much land use doctrine.
The model's central premise is that planning is a rational process that
improves on land use patterns generated by piecemeal decisions, whether those
decisions be made by market participants or by government decision
makers. 119 A subsidiary premise is that municipal decision makers can be
trusted to enact ordinances that reflect the insights of the planning process. 120
Within the plan model, rational planning requires objective analysis of data
- particularly about population and economic trends - which enables
professionals to lay out a municipality in ways that enable it to keep pace with
future development needs. 121 Building on that analysis, a commission
insulated from politics would draft a zoning ordinance for ultimate enactment
by the local legislative body. 122
The rational planning model requires doctrinal precautions against
subsequent changes that might exalt politics or self-interest over the scientific
analysis embodied in the original ordinance. Doctrine has developed such
precautions. First, although enabling statutes and zoning ordinances provide
for administrative variances, they narrowly circumscribe the power to grant
those variances. 123
Second, although the local legislative body typically has broader power to
enact zoning amendments, that power, too, is subject to doctrinal limits.
Enabling acts typically impose public hearing requirements, in part to ensure
that local officials who seek to change an ordinance must face political heat for

(1955).
119
See Haar, supra note 118, at 1155; Rose, supra note 118, at 848-49. The drafters of
the SZEA included the requirement that zoning be "in accordance with a comprehensive
plan" out of fear that municipalities would otherwise engage in "haphazard or piecemeal
zoning." STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 3 & n.22 (Advisory Comm. on
Zoning, U.S. Dep't of Commerce rev. ed. 1926), reprinted in MODEL LAND DEV. CODE 210
app. A, at 214-15 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1968).
120
But see Rose, supra note 118, at 854-56 (challenging the underlying trust granted to
decision makers in the context oflocal government). Trust on this score did not always run
deep. Often, the task of proposing the initial ordinance was left to a commission, whose
work was designed to be free from the influence of politics, on the theory that the final
product would be better if the local legislature had to adopt the work as a whole rather than
tinkering with small pieces of the ordinance. See, e.g., N.Y. TOWN LAW § 266 (requiring
appointment of commission to recommend district boundaries prior to enactment of first
zoning ordinance).
121
See Ira Michael Heyman, Innovative Land Regulation and Comprehensive Planning,
13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 183, 228-29 (1972).
122
See Anthony James Catanese, Learning by Comparison: Lessons from Experiences,
in PERSONALITY, POLITICS, AND PLANNING: How CITY PLANNERS WORK 179, 183-87
(Anthony James Catanese & W. Paul Farmer eds., 1978) (discussing the politicization of the
planning process and the changing role of independent commissions).
123
See, e.g., N.Y. ToWNLAW § 267-b.
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doing so. 124 In addition, state courts have developed prohibitions on "spot
zoning," sometimes in reliance on statutory requirements that zoning be "in
accord with the comprehensive plan." 125 Some jurisdictions have taken the
plan model one step further, treating zoning amendments as "quasi-judicial"
actions subject to searching judicial review, 126 or prohibiting all amendments
unless the amending body can demonstrate a change in conditions or a mistake
in the original ordinance. 127
The rational planning model, then, reflects a fear that developers (and to a
lesser extent neighbors) will capture the zoning process, forfeiting the insights
of the rational planning process. The assumption, then, is that local elected
officials cannot be trusted to act in the interest of the broader body politic.
Courts, by contrast, serve an important policing function, because most of the
doctrinal restrictions on zoning changes are judicially enforceable.
B.

The Public Choice Model

The rational planning model has fallen out of academic favor in recent
decades, in part because even planners have lost faith in their ability to devise
long-term end-state plans, 128 and in part out of recognition that planning and
politics cannot realistically be separated. 129 But the plan model's fall from
scholarly grace has not resulted in repeal of the restrictions on municipal
zoning activity. Perhaps the restrictions persist because the insights of legal
and planning scholarship do not immediately filter down to state zoning and
planning legislation. Another explanation reflects the influence of public
choice theory on land use regulation. 130
Public choice theory is primarily concerned with the agency costs that lead
government officials to make decisions in their own interests, which may
diverge from those of their constituents. 131 In particular, public choice
124
125

See, e.g., id. § 264(4).
See, e.g., Gaida v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n of Shelton, 947 A.2d 361, 368-70,

369 n.8 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).
126 See, e.g., Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, 480 P.2d 489, 495-96 (Wash. 1971) (en
bane).
127 See, e.g., Clayman v. Prince George's County, 292 A.2d 689, 695 (Md. 1972).
128
See, e.g., MELVILLE C. BRANCH, CONTINUOUS CITY PLANNING 47-49 (1981).
129 See Catanese, supra note 122, at 183-87.
13 For a public choice analysis of the need for judicial constraints on local government
activity, see Clayton P. Gillette, In Partial Praise of Dillon 's Rule, or, Can Public Choice
Theory Justify Local Government Law?, 67 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 959 (1991).
131 James Buchanan, one of the pioneers of public choice theory, commented that in a
"representative democracy, we must introduce the possible divergence between the interests
of the representative or agent who is elected or appointed to act for the group and the
interests of the group members themselves." James M. Buchanan, Politics Without

°

Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public Choice Theory and Its Normative Implications, in
THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE - II, at 11, 18 (James M. Buchanan & Robert D. Tollison
eds., rev. ed. 1984). Buchanan went on to observe that, among public choice scholars:
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theorists fear that government officials respond to "rent-seeking" behavior,
resulting in inefficient regulation, combined with inefficient expenditure of
resources obtaining that regulation. 132 At the local level, mobility of residents
imposes constraints on the potential for rent-seeking. More than fifty years
ago, Charles Tiebout demonstrated that, assuming enough competing
municipalities and perfect mobility of residents, competition among
municipalities could ensure efficient provision of municipal services. 133
Tiebout's assumptions, however, are heroic with respect to many
municipalities. 134 As a result, even if competition exerts some constraint on
inefficient regulation, rent-seeking remains prevalent within the land use
process. 135
Rent-seeking is not limited to any particular interest group. Developers
have much at stake in the land use process, and they are often willing to fund
politically-valuable amenities or projects in return for regulatory concessions.
Moreover, because many of the benefits developers seek are personal to them,
they do not face significant organizational problems in lobbying for those

Electoral competition has come more and more to be viewed as competition among
prospective monopolists, all of whom are bidding for an exclusive franchise, with
profit maximizing assumed to characterize the behavior of the successful bidder.
Governments are viewed as exploiters of the citizenry, rather than the means through
which the citizenry secures for itself goods and services that can best be provided
jointly or collectively.
Id. at 19.
132
Buchanan defined rent-seeking as "behavior in institutional settings where individual
efforts to maximize value generate social waste rather than social surplus." James M.
Buchanan, Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING
SOCIETY 3, 4 (James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1980).
133
Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory ofLocal Expenditures , 64 J. POL. ECON. 4 I 6, 41920 (1956).
134
See Wallace E. Oates, On Local Finance and the Tiebout Model, 71 AM. ECON. REv.
93 , 93 (1981) ("The pure [Tiebout] model ... involves a set of assumptions so patently
unrealistic as to verge on the outrageous."). For instance, scholars have questioned whether
residents may move without cost from one jurisdiction to another to take advantage of a
more attractive package of costs and governmental services, one of the foundations of the
Tiebout model. See, e.g., David Lowery & William E. Lyons, The Impact of Jurisdictional
Boundaries: An Individual-Level Test of the Tiebout Model, 51 J. POL. 73, 92-93 (1989)
(concluding that few citizens contemplate moving in response to governmental services).
Others have questioned whether municipalities act as profit-maximizers. See, e.g., Truman
F. Bewley, A Critique of Tiebout 's Theory ofLocal Public Expenditures, 49 ECONOMETRICA
713,719 (1981).
135 See Gillette, supra note 130, at 971-75 (arguing that neither exit nor voice will
adequately discipline local officials); Stewart E. Sterk, Competition Among Municipalities
as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions, 45 VAND. L. REv. 831 , 867 (1992) (concluding that
competition alone will not prevent municipalities from imposing exactions that exceed
external costs generated by new development).
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benefits. 136 Homeowners, however, are also participants in the rent-seeking
process. Although their large numbers make it harder for them to organize,
their numbers give them voting power that often enables them to dominate
local politics. 137
The goal of rent-seeking behavior, whether by developers or neighbors, is
procuring a municipal decision that authorizes (or prohibits) a particular
development, or a development of a specified type. If the decision is subject to
searching judicial review, the decision will be less valuable to the parties who
lobby for it. Judicial review, then, reduces the return on an investment in rentseeking, and consequently reduces the incentive to engage in rent-seeking.

C.

The Mediation Model

A mediation model of land use regulation, developed most extensively by
Carol Rose, shares with both the plan model and the public choice model a
recognition that in the absence of legal constraints, local officials are subject to
factional influence of special economic interests. 138 Unlike proponents of the
plan or public choice models, however, Rose embraced the role of politics in
the land use process, suggesting that local officials effectively act as mediators
in local land use disputes. 139
The mediation model rejects the rational planning ideal as unrealistic, in
large measure because government bodies will not focus on abstract planning
issues. Instead, specific development proposals that generate concrete disputes
energize local officials. 140 In the mediation model, piecemeal changes anathema to rational planners - are at the heart of land use regulation.
Planning is a rolling process that simply requires decision makers to take
careful account of a number of values in making individualized decisions. 141
Within the mediation model, participants in land use disputes derive
protection from "voice" and "exit," not from placing local officials in

136 See David A. Dana, Land Use Regulation in an Age of Heightened Scrutiny, 75 N.C.
L. REV. 1243, 1272-73 (1997). Developer influence may have a greater impact in larger
municipalities, where the issues faced by the local government are more diffuse and where
majority interests are more likely to be sacrificed in a logrolling process. See Robert C.
Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J . 385,
406-08 (1977).
137 Robert Ellickson has suggested that homeowner interests dominate many suburban
communities. See Ellickson, supra note 136, at 405-07. That proposition also serves as the
foundation for William A. Fischel's "homevoter hypothesis," which assumes that
homeowners "are the most numerous and politically influential group within most
localities." WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 4-6 (2001); see also Dana,
supra note 136, at 1273.
138 Rose, supra note 118, at 863 .
139 Id. at 887-93.
140 Id. at 874-75.
141
Id. at 875-76.
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legislative or judicial handcuffs. 142 Mediation guarantees each party input into
the decision making process, and allows each party to raise concerns beyond
those that might be reflected in any formal plan document. Moreover,
mediation encourages compromise; sometimes the interests of the parties can
be accommodated in a way that a comprehensive plan or zoning ordinance
cannot anticipate. 143 Mediation does raise the possibility of redistribution
among the parties in the process, but no one forces parties to participate in the
land use process; exit is an option for those unwilling to take regulatory risks.
Much land use doctrine developed over the past three decades is consistent
with the mediation model. Judicial condemnation of contract zoning has
moderated, and courts have developed doctrines that enforce bargains between
developers and municipalities. 144
Floating zones 145 and planned unit
146
developments provide municipalities with the flexibility to negotiate deals
with developers over individual projects, taking into account the strength and
breadth of community sentiment about project alternatives. Judicial deference

142

Albert Hirschman developed the terms "voice" and "exit" to describe two forces that
serve to discipline institutional actors, including businesses, political parties, and volunteer
organizations. ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 120-23 (1970). "Voice"
refers to the effort of a customer, member, or constituent to change existing practices, while
"exit" refers to the customer, member, or constituent' s decision to depart from the
enterprise. Id. at 4.
143 Mark Fenster has made this point in the course of criticizing the Supreme Court's
exactions doctrine:
Negotiation by property owners and local governments over the exchange of
entitlements is more likely to reach a mutually agreeable solution when parties can
consider a wide universe of terms as part of a bargain than when the negotiation is
limited in scope by formal rules imposed and enforced by external judicial agents.
Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and the
Consequences of Clarity, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 609, 675 (2004).
144 Indeed, many states have, by statute, authorized development agreements that permit
municipalities to contract to freeze regulations in order to induce development. See Green,
supra note 53, at 394-95, 400; Wegner, supra note 53, at 997-1000.
145
When a municipality' s zoning ordinance creates a floating zone, it specifies all of the
uses and standards applicable within the zone, but does not locate the zone on the zoning
map. Instead, a developer who wants to build in accordance with the zone's standards
applies to have the floating zone applied to his property. The New York Court of Appeals
approved the technique in Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 96 N.E.2d 731, 735-36 (N.Y.
1951), and other courts have followed suit. See, e.g. , Bellemeade Co. v. Priddle, 503
S.W.2d 734, 738-39 (Ky. 1973); Bigenho v. Montgomery Cnty. Council, 237 A.2d 53, 5658 (Md. 1968).
146 When a municipality zones land into a planned unit development district, it
essentially invites the developer to propose a project that the municipality will consider as a
whole, rather than requiring the developer to adhere to pre-set standards. For an early case
upholding a PUD ordinance, see Cheney v. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc. , 241 A.2d 81 , 8485 , 87 (Pa. 1968).
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to local board decisions - both on variance applications and on zoning
amendments - is also consistent with the mediation model.
The model reflected by these established doctrines, and rationalized by Rose
and others, casts municipal officials in the role of mediators. Even more
recently, a number of state legislatures have explicitly incorporated an
opportunity for more formal mediation into the land use process after
municipal officials have made their initial determination on a landowner's
application. Florida was a pioneer in providing for mediation of land use
disputes, 147 but a number of other states have followed suit. 148 In Florida, once
a local government makes a decision on a development order, an unhappy
developer can seek a mediated solution rather than proceeding directly to
litigation. 149 Although the Florida statute has been on the books for fifteen
years, developers have not made widespread use of mediation, 150 in part
because of two unresolved questions about the statutory scheme: who, besides
the developer and the municipality, will be a party to the mediation, 151 and
what rights will non-parties have to challenge any mediated solution? 152

147
The Florida Land Use and Environmental Dispute Resolution Act was enacted in
1995. FLA. STAT. § 70.51 (2010). For a general review of the act ' s operation, see Mark S.
Bentley, Understanding the Florida Land Use and Environmental Dispute Resolution Act,
37 STETSON L. REV. 381 (2008).
148 See, e.g. , CONN. GEN . STAT.§ 8-8a (2010); ME. REv. STAT. tit. 5, § 3341 (2009).
149
See FLA. STAT. § 70.51 (3).
15 Cf Bentley, supra note 147, at 390 ("[A]s of October 4, 2007, only eight out of
[Florida's] sixty-seven counties and three out of four hundred and twelve cities have
adopted procedures to implement the Act.").
151 The statute allows abutting owners and persons who submitted testimony in support
of the municipality's order to request participation in the proceeding. FLA. STAT. §
70.51(12). The statute then states that "[t]hose persons may be permitted to participate in
the hearing but shall not be granted party or intervenor status." Id.
152 The statute provides that:
The first responsibility of the special magistrate is to facilitate a resolution of the
conflict between the owner and governmental entities to the end that some modification
of the owner's proposed use of the property or adjustment in the development order or
enforcement action or regulatory efforts by one or more of the governmental parties
may be reached. Accordingly, the special magistrate shall act as a facilitator or
mediator between the parties in an effort to effect a mutually acceptable solution. The
parties shall be represented at the mediation by persons with authority to bind their
respective parties to a solution, or by persons with authority to recommend a solution
directly to the persons with authority to bind their respective parties to a solution.
Id. § 70.5 l(l 7)(a). The statute does not indicate what rights any non-party has in those
cases where the parties reach a mutually acceptable solution. Where the parties do not reach
such a solution, the statute permits the special magistrate to make recommendations, which
the magistrate then submits to the governmental entity for consideration. Id.§ 70.51(21). If
the developer is unhappy with the governmental entity's action, the developer may then
bring an action. Id. § 70.51(24). The statute does not discuss the right of a non-party to
challenge the governmental entity's action.

°
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Within the mediation model, voice and exit - not robust judicial oversight shape and discipline municipal decisions. Land use decisions acquire
legitimacy if all affected parties had the opportunity to participate in the
process. Participation is the mechanism for transforming land use regulation
from a zero-sum game to one where the interests of multiple parties can be
accommodated. Judicial review retains a role within the mediation model, but
the focus of judicial review is on ensuring that all parties have had an
opportunity to participate in the decision making process, not on evaluating the
merits of the municipality's decision.
D.

The Role ofSettlement Restrictions Within the Models

Although litigation plays a role within each of the models of land use
regulation, the roles vary considerably among the models. Within the plan and
public choice models, litigation operates primarily to protect against regulatory
capture. By contrast, voice and exit - not litigation - provide the principal
safeguard against capture within the mediation model. If municipal officials
are to act as effective mediators, however, participation by all interested parties
is critical - both because participation itself may be a value, 153 and because
participation generates information that permits officials to make more
informed decisions. 154 Within the mediation model, litigation operates to
ensure adequate participation in the decision making process. 155

153
In the words of Roderick Hills, local government theorists have sometimes argued
that "participation in local politics is not only a good way to control government, but also a
useful way to transform citizens, imbuing them with civic spirit, a taste for public affairs,
and political skills." Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Romancing the Town: Why We (Still) Need a
Democratic Defense of City Power, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2009, 2009 (2000) (reviewing
GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS
(1999)). Gerald Frug in particular has championed the city as an entity that fosters political
participation, which he views as freedom enhancing.
Jerry Frug, Decentering
Decentralization, 60 U. Cm. L. REV. 253, 257 (1993) (discussing ''the freedom gained from
the ability to participate in the basic societal decisions that affect one's life"); Gerald E.
Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1067-73 (1980); see also
Richard Briffault, Our Loca/ism: Part II - Loca/ism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
346, 396 (1990); Fenster, supra note 143, at 671-72.
For other discussions of the advantages of participation, see Carol M. Rose, New Models
for Local Land Use Decisions, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1155, 1168 (1985) (stating that the goal
within the mediation process is to assure, through participation, the "parties' future ability to
get along"); Rose, supra note 118, at 898 (stressing that "'venting"' alone may "help[] the
disputants to accept a decision").
154
See Rose, supra note 118, at 898 (remarking that "voice" keeps decision makers
"informed of costs and benefits").
155
Id. at 900 ("[C]ourt[s] should focus on voice in mediation and ask whether the local
body went through the steps of identifying disputants, exploring issues, and explaining
results.").
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Amelioration of doctrinal restrictions on settlement would reduce the
number of land use disputes that proceed to final judgment. This Section
demonstrates, however, that those doctrinal restrictions, in their current form,
are not necessary to preserve the role of litigation as a tool for disciplining
municipal behavior.
1.

Settlement Restrictions as a Constraint on Developer Capture

Public choice theory suggests that developers may exert disproportionate
influence in the land use process because their interests are highly
concentrated, 156 eliminating the organization problems that face neighbors who
might oppose development. Statutory and judicially-imposed constraints on
the decisions municipal officials make, which neighbors enforce through
litigation, reduce the value of any concessions a developer receives from
municipal officials, and therefore reduce the amount the developer will be
willing to pay to influence those officials. The threat of litigation has a similar
salutary effect within the plan model: developers will be willing to spend less
to obtain deviations from the plan if neighbors can litigate to undo those
deviations.
Within these models, the litigation that disciplines municipal officials is
litigation that neighbors bring. But once the neighbors commence litigation
challenging municipal action, there is little reason for legal doctrine to
constrain the power of the interested parties (neighbors, municipality, and
developer) to settle the dispute. Any potential settlement will reflect the
parties' expectation of success in the litigation, 157 and the prospect of
settlement should create the same incentives for the developer as the prospect
of litigation. So long as the doctrinal rules that would be applied in litigation
are adequately protective of neighbor interests, there is every reason to believe
that settlement - which reflects the expected result of litigation - should
generate the same deterrent effect as litigation to judgment.
Similarly, within the plan model, if the threat of litigation operates to
preserve the sanctity of the plan, it does so only to the extent neighbors are
willing to challenge municipal decisions favoring developers. 158 Because the
willingness of neighbors to settle will generally reflect their prospects in
litigation, settlement is not likely to weaken neighbor litigation as a mechanism
for safeguarding the plan.

156

See Dana, supra note 136, at 1272; Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just
Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279, 289 (1992); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Planning as
Public Use?, 34 E COLOGY L.Q. 443 , 466 (2007).
157 See Priest & Klein, supra note 24, at 4-17 .
158 The neighbors may not care about preserving the plan, but only about the private
benefits they derive from preventing a proposed development. As a result, the situations in
which they choose to litigate may not coincide with the cases in which proponents of plan
jurisprudence might believe litigation would be socially optimal. See Shavell, supra note
10, at 575-79.
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This analysis suggests that, from a regulatory capture perspective, there is
little advantage to superimposing public hearing requirements or additional
environmental review on settlements approved by the litigating parties - the
neighbors, the municipality, and the developer. Imposing such requirements
would make litigation relatively more attractive than settlement, but would not
provide any additional safeguards against regulatory capture.
Of course, many of the costs of restrictions on settlement will be generated
not in litigation commenced by neighbors, but in litigation brought by
developers. Restricting settlement of those cases, however, will have little
effect on regulatory capture. By hypothesis, the developer has already lost
before the municipal officials, suggesting that the municipal officials were not
terribly susceptible to capture in the first instance. One might imagine cases in
which municipal officials hope to have it both ways - by making public
decisions popular with neighbors with the expectation that the developer will
then sue, leading the municipality to capitulate. In that way, municipal
officials might seek "cover" from the ultimate capitulation. 159 But in those
cases, municipal officials are unlikely to settle any litigation brought by the
developer, even if there are no doctrinal restrictions on settlement. The
"cover" will be much more effective if a court orders the municipality to
rescind the restrictions than if the municipality accomplishes the same result
through settlement.
Perhaps concerns about regulatory capture are most significant during
regime transitions. 160 Municipal officials might enact a zoning restriction or
deny a permit or variance during one administration. During the course of
litigation by the developer, that regime might be replaced by a new
administration more sympathetic to development. In that circumstance, one
might reasonably be concerned that the new administration would be too quick
to settle on terms unfavorable to neighbors. In that situation, however, the new
administration could evade any restrictions on settlement of litigation by using
its new power to rescind the offending restrictions. Even in this circumstance,
then, concerns about regulatory capture provide no justification for doctrinal
restrictions on settlement.
2.

Settlement Restrictions as a Protection Against Uninformed Decisions

Unless municipal officials have adequate information about the impact
zoning changes or development approvals would have on neighboring
landowners, those officials are unlikely to function effectively as mediators
between developers and neighbors. Many of the doctrinal requirements that

159
See Jeffrey H. Goldfien, Thou Shalt Love Thy Neighbor: RLU/PA and the Mediation
of Religious Land Use Disputes, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 435,460.
16
For discussion of the problems associated with settlement during presidential
transitions, see Jim Rossi, Bargaining in the Shadow of Administrative Procedure: The
Public Interest in Rulemaking Settlement, 51 DUKE L.J. 1015, 1033-43 (2001).
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surround zoning decisions - from public hearing requirements 161 to
environmental review procedures 162 - are designed in part to ensure that
decision makers are fully informed.
From an information perspective, permitting municipal officials to settle
litigation with developers presents a potential problem: a settlement on terms
different from those originally considered at a public hearing may not be vetted
as fully as was the original proposal municipal officials rejected. On that basis,
one might contend that doctrinal restrictions on settlement - including the
requirement of additional public hearings and environmental review - remain
important safeguards in the municipal decision making process.
Two factors undermine this argument. First, the initial public hearing on a
controversial zoning issue is likely to educate municipal officials not just about
neighborhood objections to the developer's particular proposal, but also about
more general neighbor perspectives on appropriate development of the area. In
a state that requires environmental review of the initial proposal, that review
most likely included review of the environmental impact of alternative
development proposals. 163 All of that information remains available to
municipal officials considering subsequent settlement offers, reducing the
likelihood that settlement decisions will be based on too little information.
Second, compare the information available to municipal officials evaluating
settlement proposals with the information base on which a decision will be
made if there is no settlement. In that instance, if a court overturns the
municipality's decision, it has two alternatives. Most frequently, the court will
remand to the local board for reconsideration of the developer's application. 164
At that point, there will be additional opportunity for interested parties to
generate information about any proposed development.
In other
circumstances, courts approve the developer's project, without soliciting any
public comment or conducting further environmental review. 165 When that
161
See Rose, supra note 118, at 897; Daniel P. Selmi, Reconsidering the Use of Direct
Democracy in Making Land Use Decisions, 19 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y 293, 296
(2001/2002).
162
See, e.g., Citizens Alliance to Protect Our Wetlands v. City of Auburn, 894 P.2d
1300, 1304 (Wash. 1995) (en bane) (indicating that the impact statement requirement is
designed to make sure decision makers have "sufficient information to make a reasoned
decision"); Sterk, supra note 73, at 2052-53; see also Keith H. Hirokawa, The Prima Facie
Burden and the Vanishing SEPA Threshold: Washington's Emerging Preference for
Efficiency over Accuracy, 37 GONZ. L. REV. 403 , 403, 428-29 (2002) (examining the
exchange of environmental information under a Washington state statute); Rose, supra note
153, at 1169 (explaining that environmental impact review shares some characteristics with
mediation, such as collecting information).
163
See, e.g., N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW§ 8-0109(2)(d), (2)(j) (McKinney Supp. 2010).
164
See, e.g., In re Stadsvold, 754 N.W.2d 323, 332 (Minn. 2008).
165
See, e.g., Wendy's Old Fashioned Hamburgers of N.Y., Inc. v. Bd. of Appeal, 909
N .E.2d 1161, 1172-73 (Mass. 2009) (ordering grant of special permit and variance because
remand "would delay an inevitable result").
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happens, the final decision on the developer's project will be based on no more
information than would be available at the time of any settlement of the
developer's claim. As a result, it is not clear to what extent restricting
settlement will ensure a fuller information base for zoning decisions.
3.

Settlement Restrictions as a Mechanism for Assuring Participation

"Voice" plays multiple roles within the mediation model of land use
regulation. Not only does voice act to insure informed decision making, it also
lends legitimacy to the ultimate decision made by municipal officials. 166 When
constituents have an opportunity to participate in local political decisions, the
chances increase that they will accept even determinations adverse to their
interests. 167
On the participation score, easy settlement of litigation between a developer
and the municipality presents a problem. Neighbors, who have prevailed
before the local board of trustees or zoning board of appeals, now discover that
their victory may have been pyrrhic - because the developer has, through
negotiation conducted without broad neighborhood participation, obtained
relief denied to it through the ordinary, open, political channels.
Of course, when a dispute between a developer and the municipality is
resolved through litigation, there will generally be no opportunity for neighbor
participation. But at least if the litigation continues through to judgment,
municipal officials will have advanced, in a public forum, the position the
municipality endorsed through the political processes. Moreover, the judicial
system itself is imbued with a sense of legitimacy in resolving disputes,
reducing any sense of unfairness to non-participating neighbors. 168 Closeddoor settlements, by contrast, have neither of these features. As a result, easy
settlement, without neighbor participation, or even an opportunity for
neighbors to be heard, creates legitimacy problems within the mediation
model.
4.

Settlement Restrictions as a Constraint on Neighbor Capture

Another possible justification for restrictions on settlement focuses on
protecting against inefficiencies generated by neighbor capture of the
regulatory process. Suppose municipal officials know that all actions that
disgruntled developers bring will be litigated to final judgment. Those
officials now have an incentive to act reasonably in imposing restrictions on a
developer, because unreasonable restrictions generate a high risk of loss in

166

See Melvyn R. Durchslag, Forgotten Federalism: The Takings Clause and Local
land Use Decisions, 59 MD. L. REv. 464, 486 (2000) (observing that participatory
opportunities in resolving land use disputes afford those opposing the decision "the ability
to help frame the ... debate"); Rose, supra note 153, at 1168.
167
See Fenster, supra note 143, at 670.
168
One of the reasons judges and courts enjoy a sense of legitimacy stems from the
requirement that they explain their decisions. Cf Rose, supra note 118, at 899-900.
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litigation, which leaves the municipality in a weaker position than if it had
acted reasonably.
By contrast, one might surmise that if those same officials knew that
settlement of a litigation were a possibility, they might push the envelope a bit
further, enacting unreasonable regulations with the understanding that if the
developer were to bring suit, the municipality could then offer to settle on
terms more reasonable to the developer. That is, the possibility of subsequent
settlement might lead municipal officials to act less reasonably ex ante. 169
Although some municipal officials might behave that way, the strategy will
typically be a losing one if developers act rationally. The strategy depends on
the assumption that the municipality will be able to retreat from unreasonable
restrictions once a developer starts litigation. But that assumption depends on
the developer's willingness to negotiate.
The more unreasonable the
municipality's original determination, the more likely the developer will
prevail in the litigation, and the less willing the developer will be to settle on
terms that are attractive to the municipality.l7° As a result, the prospect of

169

Justice Scalia raised a similar fear in his opinion in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), where he wrote that he might expect that a regime in
which a pennit condition did not have to serve the same governmental purpose as a
pennissible development ban "would produce stringent land-use regulation which the State
then waives to accomplish other purposes, leading to lesser realization of the land-use goals
purportedly sought to be served." Id. at 837 & n.5.
170
The process can be modeled as a two-player game in which the municipality moves
first by deciding whether to act reasonably or unreasonably in evaluating a developer's
application. The developer then decides whether to litigate or to settle. Assume that if the
municipality enacts an unreasonable regulation, and the regulation remains in force, the
developer does not develop, leaving the municipality with no costs or benefits. Assume also
that if the neighbor-dominated municipality imposes "reasonable" restrictions on the
developer, the resulting aggregate hann to the neighbors will be $400,000. If, however, the
developer can develop free of restrictions, the harm to the neighbors will be $1,000,000. In
this stylized example, assume the harm the development generates for the neighbors is
precisely equal to the benefit to the developer.
If the municipality enacts the reasonable regulation, the developer faces an uphill battle in
any litigation. Assume, for instance, that the developer has only a I 0% chance of
prevailing. The value of any litigation to the developer is $60,000 (the developer has a I 0%
probability of reaping an additional $600,000 in benefit). In that circumstance, the cost and
delays attendant to litigation will generally make it worth the developer's while to accept the
municipality's regulation. Because the municipality knows that, there is little reason for the
municipality to offer any more in settlement. The result is a regulation that generates
$400,000 in benefit to the developer, and an equal cost to the neighbors.
Suppose instead that the municipality enacts an unreasonable regulation, and assume now
that the developer has a 60% chance of prevailing in litigation (allowing for the
extraordinary deference courts typically afford to municipal land use decisions). The
expected value of the litigation to the developer is $600,000 (60% of$ I ,000,000). In the
absence of doctrinal restrictions on settlement, the municipality could make a settlement
offer to avoid potential loss in the litigation (and the attendant litigation costs). But the
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settlement should not induce the municipality to act unreasonably, and
concerns about neighbor capture do not justify doctrinal constraints on
settlement.
5.

Summary

Within both the plan and the public choice models of land use regulation,
litigation plays a significant role in guarding against regulatory capture.
Permitting unconstrained settlement does not significantly undermine that role.
If the primary concern is capture by developers, the municipality will, by
hypothesis, have capitulated to developers, leading to litigation by neighbors.
But even if there are no doctrinal constraints on settlement, neighbors will be
unlikely to settle on terms less favorable than their expected result in litigation,
providing adequate protection against collusion between the municipality and
developers.
Similarly, if the primary concern involves capture by neighbors, the
developer is unlikely to settle on terms less favorable than those the developer
believes it can obtain in litigation, so that doctrinal restraints on settlement are
unnecessary to deter municipal officials from capitulating to those neighbors.
The case for doctrinal constraints on settlement is somewhat stronger within
the mediation model, where the threat of litigation operates to ensure informed
and participatory decision making. In particular, permitting settlements to bind
persons who had no opportunity to participate in the settlement process
threatens the legitimacy of the regulatory process. The next Section considers
alternative mechanisms for addressing that concern while mitigating the
inefficiencies associated with current doctrine.
III. POTENTIAL SETTLEMENT STRUCTURES

As Part I demonstrated, the principal doctrinal obstacle to settlement of land
use litigation is the potential for attack on the settlement by affected parties principally neighbors, but in some instances other governmental entities.
Unless a doctrinal framework can preclude such attacks, settlement will remain
unattractive to developers who challenge municipal land use decisions. This
Part considers four alternative frameworks - one that eliminates doctrinal
restrictions altogether, a second that seeks to ensure that municipal decision
makers will better represent their constituents, a third that relies on judicial
approval to represent non-parties to the litigation, and a fourth that relies on
neighbors themselves to represent their interests.

developer would have no reason to accept such an offer unless the municipality's offer
approached the value of the litigation. So long as that is true, the municipality does not
obtain any better payoff by enacting an unreasonable regulation than by enacting a
reasonable regulation. Hence, the rational choice for the municipality is to enact the
reasonable regulation. The ready availability of settlement does not induce the municipality
to enact unreasonable restrictions.
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A. Dispensing with All Doctrinal Restrictions
Perhaps the simplest way to encourage settlement of land use disputes
would be to permit municipal officials to approve settlement of litigation with
a developer without requiring time-consuming subsequent approval by the
relevant land use boards, with their attendant public hearings. Doctrine could
accomplish virtually the same result by denying neighbors standing to
challenge any settlement. The two solutions are virtually equivalent because
standing would do the neighbors little good if doctrine removed any doctrinal
basis on which the neighbors could frame a complaint.
Giving municipal officials a free hand to settle land use litigation would
resemble the judicial approach to settlement of another class of public law
litigation: administrative agency enforcement proceedings. Just as municipal
officials are charged with interpreting and enforcing local land use regulations,
administrative agencies are charged with enforcement of a wide variety of
statutes and regulations. When an agency brings an enforcement proceeding
against a regulated entity in alleged violation of a statute or regulation, th.e
parties might want to settle, but settlement would be of little value to the
regulated entity if third parties were free to challenge the settlement.
The D.C. Circuit, relying on the Supreme Court's opinion in Heckler v.
Chaney, 171 has held that agency decisions to settle enforcement proceedings
are unreviewable. 172 The court has applied the presumption to settlements that
are forward-looking as well as backward-looking. 173 Thus, in addition to

171
470 U.S. 821 (1985). In Chaney, the Supreme Court held that an agency's decision
not to bring an enforcement proceeding is presumptively unreviewable, relying on section
70l(a)(2) of the Administrative Procedure Act, id. at 832, which creates an exception to the
Act's judicial review provisions in cases where "agency action is committed to agency
discretion by law," 5 U.S.C. § 70l(a)(2) (2006). In concluding that enforcement decisions
are committed to agency discretion, the Court reasoned, analogizing to principles of
prosecutorial discretion, that agencies are in the best position to assess whether enforcement
resources are best spent on pursuing a particular alleged violation, and on whether the
enforcement proceeding is likely to succeed. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831-32.
Chaney itself involved a challenge by death row inmates to the FDA's failure to bring an
enforcement action against states that planned to use drugs for lethal injections even though
the FDA had not approved the drugs for that purpose. Id. at 823. Perhaps tongue-in-cheek,
the challengers contended that the FDA was required to approve the drugs "as 'safe and
effective' for human execution" and that the FDA should affix warnings to the drugs stating
that "they were unapproved and unsafe for human execution." Id. at 824.
172
Ass'n of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 494 F.3d 1027, 1030-31 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Bait.
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 252 F.3d 456, 461 (D.C. Cir. 2001);
N.Y. State Dep't of Law v. FCC, 984 F.2d 1209, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Schering Corp. v.
Heckler, 779 F.2d 683, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The Third Circuit also applied the
presumption of nonreviewability in Mahoney v. U.S. Consumer Products Safety
Commission, 146 F. App'x 587, 589 (3d Cir. 2005).
173
Lisa Bressman has criticized application of the presumption to cases in which the
agency abstains from enforcing statutes and rules against future conduct. She contends that
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settlements in which the agency required a regulated entity to make payments
for past violations, 174 the presumption applies to settlements by which the
agency agreed to abstain from taking action for a specified period of time, 175
and settlements which required the regulated party to take action in the
future . 176 The presumption applies without regard to the stage of the dispute
during which the parties reach settlement. 177
In the typical agency enforcement provision, then, the presumption of
nonreviewability effectively confers on agencies broad power to settle with
regulated entities. 178 As a result, the potential for third-party claims should not
significantly interfere with the incentives of the agency and regulated entities
to settle their disputes. 179

"[s]ince the societal interest in preventing future harms to statutory beneficiaries is 'more
focused and in many circumstances more pressing' than the societal interest in punishing the
past conduct of particular individuals, it often will justify increased judicial review and
reduced administrative control." Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency
Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1695 (2004) (quoting
Chaney, 470 U.S. at 847-48 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment)).
174 See N. Y. State Dep 't ofLaw, 984 F.2d at 1212 (describing consent decree under which
regulated telephone companies accused of overcharges agreed to make "voluntary"
contributions to the U.S. Treasury in lieu of forfeitures).
175 See Schering, 779 F.2d at 685.
176 See Ass 'n of Irritated Residents, 494 F.3d at 1029 (describing agreements in which
agency settled with animal feed operations on terms that required operations to help fund
study and to permit facilities to be monitored in the study); Bait. Gas & Elec. Co., 252 F.3d
at 457 (stating that agency agreed to settle on terms that required natural gas vendors to
determine whether there was demand for increased capacity, and, if so, to make that
capacity available to customers).
177
Thus, the court has applied the presumption when the settlement followed agency
initiation of enforcement proceedings, see N. Y. State Dep 't of Law, 984 F.2d at 1212, when
the settlement preceded any proceedings, see Ass 'n of Irritated Residents, 494 F.3d at 1035,
and when the settlement followed a declaratory judgment action by a regulated entity, see
Schering, 779 F.2d at 684-85.
178 By applying the presumption, courts have often avoided the standing issue. For
instance, in Ass 'n of Irritated Residents, 484 F .3d 1027, the agency disputed challengers'
standing to contest a settlement, but the D.C. Circuit held that the presumption of
nonreviewability deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1030-31. The court
thus disposed of the standing claim in a footnote: "Although petitioners ' standing was also
challenged, this court is not bound to consider jurisdictional questions in any particular
order." Id. at 1030 n.1.
179
Because the presumption is rebuttable, limited potential for third-party actions
remains. Heckler v. Chaney makes it clear that Congress may limit an agency's
enforcement decision. 470 U.S. 821 , 832-33 (1985). For an application of the exception,
see FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 , 25 (1998) (holding that where the agency' s decision not to
enforce a disclosure requirement against a particular organization rested, even in part, on a
misconstruction of statutory language, voters could challenge the agency's interpretation of
the language, and hence the agency's decision not to enforce). But the D.C. Circuit, in
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Unfortunately, the analogy between settlement of land use litigation and
settlement of federal agency litigation is imperfect. First, federal agency
officials typically have more information at their disposal than do municipal
officials. Federal agencies are staffed by well-trained, full-time officials.
Local zoning officials, by contrast, are often lay volunteers dependent on the
parties they regulate for critical information. 180 As a result, permitting
unrestrained settlement raises concerns not present in the federal agency
context.
Second, federal agencies do not depend on political participation for their
legitimacy. Instead, agencies are accountable to the political branches of the
federal govemment. 181 Within the Madisonian framework, the wide range of
issues and the need for each interest group to build coalitions prevents
domination of the political branches by any single faction. 182 Municipal
zoning officials, by contrast, do not enjoy comparable insulation from faction;
wide and visible participation by constituents may function as a substitute
mechanism for building legitimacy. Allowing officials to settle litigation
without input from the parties who prevailed before the relevant zoning agency
threatens to undermine that legitimacy.

settlement cases, has been careful to assure that no statute operated to rebut the presumption
of nonreviewability. See, e.g., Ass 'n of Irritated Residents, 494 F.3d. at I 032; Bait. Gas &
E/ec. Co., 252 F.3d at 460 ("Nowhere does the act place an affirmative obligation on FERC
to initiate an enforcement action, nor does it impose limitations on FERC's discretion to
settle such an action.").
180
A number of states have enacted mandatory training programs for local zoning
officials out of recognition that most decisions are made by inexperienced volunteers
unfamiliar with the issues they are required to address. See Anthony J. Samson, A Proposal
to Implement Mandatory Training Requirements for Home Rule Zoning Officials, 2008
MICH. ST. L. REV. 879, 881-82, 897-98.
181
See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist
Foundations, 1787-1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1260-61 (2006); Lisa Schultz Bressman,
Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1809-14 (2007)
(concluding that the Supreme Court's cases can be understood as establishing a set of
mutual political checks, by Congress and the President, on agency action); Mark Seidenfeld,
Why Agencies Act: A Reassessment of the Ossification Critique ofJudicial Review, 70 Omo
ST. L.J. 251,298 (2009).
182
In Federalist Paper No. 10, Madison, after discussing the evils of democratic
government within a small territory, wrote:
Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it
less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the
rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for
all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 60 (James Madison) (The Lawbook Exch., Ltd. & Martino
Publ'g spec. ed. 2001) (1788).
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The Representation-Reieforcing Approach: Public Hearings as a
Safeguard

One way to address the information and participation deficit generated by an
approach that permits unrestrained settlement would be to require that
municipal officials conduct public hearings on proposed settlements, and vote
to approve those settlements only at the close of the public hearing. Once the
municipal body concludes the hearing and approves the settlement, litigation
challenging the settlement would be foreclosed. Indeed, three New Jersey
lawyers, two of them judges, proposed such an approach about fifteen years
ago.183
Like the unrestrained settlement approach, requiring public hearings as a
safeguard finds an analog in federal administrative law. When a regulated
party challenges an agency rule that was the product of notice-and-comment
rulemaking, a settlement that resulted in a change in the rule would require a
second round in the notice-and-comment process. 184 Moreover, liberal
standing rules for challenges to administrative rules limit the finality of
settlement. 185
Within the agency context, at least two factors mitigate any disincentive to
settlement created by the requirement that rules developed within a settlement
be subjected to notice-and-comment procedures. First, because the agency's
professional staff will typically have greater capacity to assess the
consequences of settlement than will local officials, the likelihood is smaller
that facts will emerge in the notice-and-comment process that would lead the
agency to upset the settlement. Second, and more important, the agency that

183

Richard S. Cohen, Douglas K. Wolfson & Kathleen Meehan DalCortivo, Settling
Land Use Litigation While Protecting the Public Interest: Whose Lawsuit is this Anyway?,
23 SETON HALL L. REV. 844, 868-71 (1993).
184
The Supreme Court has held that an agency may not repeal a rule promulgated
through the notice and comment process without going through the same notice and
comment process. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 41-42 (1983); see also Jeffrey M. Gaba, Informal Rulemaking by Settlement
Agreement, 73 GEO L.J. 1241, 1245-46 (1985); Rossi, supra note 160, at 1051 (explaining
that judicial and executive review "helps to ensure that the public interest is not skirted
through a rulemaking settlement and its implementation"). Professor Rossi argues,
however, that in some cases an agency may circumvent notice and comment requirements
by adopting interpretive rules or policy statements not subject to APA review. Id. at 1055.
185
Article Ill's case or controversy requirement places limits on the power of a public
citizen to challenge administrative rules unless the litigant can show concrete and
particularized injury. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). But
the D.C. Circuit has held that the Chamber of Commerce has standing to challenge the
SEC's regulation of mutual funds because it invested in, and wanted to continue to invest in,
funds not governed in accordance with the SEC's rule. Chamber of Commerce of the
United States v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 896-97, 899 (D.C. Cir. 2006). For discussion of
standing rules more generally, see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in
Implementing an Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1239, 1275-85 (1989).
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agrees to the settlement is the same agency that will conduct the rulemaking
process and promulgate the new rule. 186 By contrast, in the land use process,
the division of authority among local boards means that the public hearing, and
the decision following the hearing, will often be made by a group of lay
officials who played no role in the settlement negotiation. From the
developer's standpoint, the disparity in parties increases the risk - and
decreases the value - of settlement.
Within the land use context, a number of problems suggest that a public
hearing requirement offers no panacea. First, what presumptions would
surround the public hearing? If the hearing were designed to be largely a
rubber stamp of a settlement already reached, the hearing would serve little
purpose. But if the hearing were designed to give serious consideration to
substantive objections to a settlement, the prospect of public hearings would
generate a strong disincentive to settlement. A developer considering whether
to settle rather than litigate would discount the value of settlement to reflect
two unattractive alternatives: (1) the municipality might disapprove the
settlement entirely after conducting the hearing; and (2) the municipality might
condition approval of the settlement on additional concessions by the
developer - resulting in the need for additional negotiations and, perhaps,
public hearings.
Second, a public hearing requirement inevitably opens the settlement
process to attack on the grounds that the hearing was inadequate. That is,
aggrieved neighbors might allege that the municipality provided inadequate
notice of the hearing, or rely on other procedural inadequacies. If courts or
legislatures were to impose a hearing requirement on municipal decision
makers, it would be difficult to justify precluding aggrieved citizens from
attacking settlements for failure to comply with the mandated procedures.
The problem, then, is that if settlements could be insulated from subsequent
attack only if the municipality conducted a serious public hearing addressed to
the merits of the settlement, developers would not be significantly more likely
to settle than they are under current law, which typically conditions settlements
on the municipality's compliance with statutory or common law procedures for
amending ordinances or granting variances or permits - procedures which
generally require public hearings.
Conversely, if the municipality were required only to conduct a pro forma
public hearing on the settlement, but were contractually (or perhaps even
morally) bound to abide by the settlement agreement, the public hearing

186

Another factor mitigating any disincentive to settlement is the challenger's belief that
it might have more influence in crafting a new rule as part of the settlement process than it
might have in the more open notice-and-comment process that would arise after judicial
invalidation of the original rule. See Cary Coglianese, Litigating Within Relationships:
Disputes and Disturbance in the Regulatory Process, 30 LAW & Soc'y REv. 735, 757
(1996); Rossi, supra note 160, at 1029-30.
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requirement will not reduce the agency costs that generated the hearing
requirement in the first place. The result, therefore, is that a public hearing
requirement offers little promise for resolving the settlement dilemma.
C.

Judicial Approval: The "Consent Decree" Approach

A third approach to settlement would rely on judicial approval of the
settlement as a mechanism for precluding subsequent attacks on the settlement.
This approach would effectively transform a settlement of land use litigation
into a "consent decree" common in other areas of public law litigation. Once
litigation begins, if parties choose to settle, they could seek judicial approval of
the settlement. The court would then review the terms of the settlement perhaps after conducting a "fairness" hearing - and judicial approval would
preclude non-parties from challenging the settlement. 187
Consent decrees have become common in federal court challenges to local
zoning laws, particularly when the challenge alleges housing discrimination in
violation of federal law. 188 In recent years, some states have permitted
developers and municipalities to use the consent decree approach in ways that
would permit the litigating parties to bypass state law procedural
requirements. 189
The consent decree approach removes some of the uncertainty of the
representation-reinforcing approach, and therefore makes settlement more
attractive. One would expect that, especially over time, judicial reaction to
settlement agreements would become predictable - or at least considerably
more predictable than the reaction of elected officials after contentious public
hearings - making it possible for settling parties to account for judicial
reactions at the time they structure their settlements. 190 Moreover, subsequent
attacks on judicially-approved settlements are far less likely to be successful
than subsequent attacks on settlements reached without judicial imprimatur. 191

187 See Larry Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights of Third Parties, 87 MICH. L.
REv. 321, 322 (1988) (discussing two critical features of consent decrees, the fairness
hearing and the "collateral attack bar").
188 See, e.g., United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 29 F.3d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1994);
Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. St. Bernard Parish, 641 F. Supp. 2d 563, 565
(E.D. La. 2009).
189 See, e.g., City of Torrington v. Zoning Comm'n of Harwinton, 806 A.2d 1020, 1024
(Conn. 2002). But see David L. Callies, The Use of Consent Decrees in Settling Land Use
and Environmental Disputes, 21 STETSON L. REV. 871, 885 (1992) (concluding that, as of
1992, "[s]tate courts appear less likely to permit consent decrees that adversely affect local
zoning and environmental laws").
190 See Sanford I. Weisburst, Judicial Review of Settlements and Consent Decrees: An
Economic Analysis, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 62-63 (1999).
191 See Kramer, supra note 187, at 322.
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While making settlement easier, judicial review also addresses some of the
agency costs that play central roles in the plan and public choice models. 192 If
we typically trust courts to police municipal officials who would too readily
depart from a rational plan (the plan model) or who would collude too readily
with dominant factions (the public choice model), the consent decree approach
holds out promise not present with the representation-reinforcing approach.
Nevertheless, the consent decree approach is not without its problems. First,
a court has limited information on which to evaluate the proposed consent
decree. 193 The municipality and the developer both support the decree, and are
unlikely to make a case for setting it aside. 194 Inviting neighbors ( or the public
at large) to participate in a "fairness" hearing might augment the information
available to the court, but collective action problems might limit neighbor
participation. 195
Second, even if a court has multiple perspectives on the consent decree, the
court faces another problem: how should it deal with that information? The
only formal parties to the proceeding are the developer and the municipality.
A court has no basis for superimposing its own views on the parties or for
mediating a dispute between parties and non-parties; 196 at most, it can decide to
condition its approval of the consent decree on changes in the agreed-upon
terms. That, however, sends the parties back to the bargaining table, and if
courts take that approach too often, the results will be to make settlement more
costly.
Finally, if a court were to issue consent decrees based only on the request of
the developer and the municipality, the court would be treating neighbors and
members of the public only as information sources, not as right-bearing
individuals. That is, to be of significant value, the consent decree would cut
off the legal rights of neighbors without their permission, and without any
adjudication of the merits of their legal position. 197 By contrast, if the
municipality had approved a developer's proposal before the start of any
litigation, the neighbors would have had standing to challenge the approval.
The effect of the consent decree, then, would be to preclude neighbors from
192
See Weisburst, supra note 190, at 58-59 (discussing judicial review of settlements as
a response to inadequate representation).
193
Judith Resnick, Judging Consent, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43, 101; Weisburst, supra
note 190, at 64.
194
Fiss, supra note l 0, at 1082.
195
Weisburst, supra note 190, at 65-66.
196
Cf Kramer, supra note 187, at 353-55 (observing that third parties cannot force
adjudication of a claim if two parties wish to settle; at best, a third party can bring a separate
action to enforce its own rights).
197 As Larry Kramer notes, consent decrees also have the potential to lower the cost of
enforcement of a settlement agreement. See id. at 326. That advantage is often of little
importance in the land use context because once the project has been approved and
completed, no further issues are likely to generate any need for enforcement of the
settlement agreement.

LAND USE DISPUTES

2011]

267

raising legal issues that they previously had standing to raise, even though they
were not parties to the proceeding that cut off their rights. That result is in
tension with foundational principles of claim preclusion. 198 It is also entirely
inconsistent with the mediation model of land use regulation; neighbors who
negotiated - successfully - for a particular result before municipal officials
now find themselves excluded from any participation in a settlement that
materially changes the result of their negotiation.
D.

The Participation Approach

Perhaps the most promising approach to facilitating settlement would give
neighbors and other aggrieved parties the opportunity to participate in the
proceeding between the developer and the municipality, and to preclude
subsequent attack on any settlement by parties who choose not to participate.
This approach builds, of necessity, on the consent decree approach, because
without some form of judicial imprimatur, there would be no basis for binding
non-participants to any settlement. 199 The bar to subsequent attacks would
create certainty for the parties not generally available under current doctrine,
and therefore make settlement more attractive than current law. At the same
time, because participating neighbors would become parties to the litigation,
they would have to consent to any settlement. For this reason, a participationbased approach would be most consistent with the mediation models of land
use regulation.
A developer could join neighbors and other potential objectors as defendants
in a suit against a municipality, but such joinder presents conceptual
difficulties because the developer is not seeking relief from those parties;
instead, the developer typically wants the municipality to rescind or modify its

198
199

Id. at 331-38.
Id. at 331.
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action. 200 Doctrinally, the more promising avenue is to permit neighbors to
intervene in the action between the developer and the municipality. 201
Giving neighbors a right to intervene would be of little value if the
neighbors did not have notice of the litigation. To be effective as a device for
promoting participation-based settlement, the developer would have to provide
notice. Due process typically requires adequate notice to a party of a judicial
proceeding when that proceeding would bar that party's legal claims. 202
Notice would therefore have to be provided to all potential parties who would
otherwise have standing to challenge the municipality's decision to settle. But
standing in land use cases is often fuzzy, making it difficult for a municipality
or developer to be sure that they have provided personal notice to every person
who might have standing. 203 Ultimately, however, it would seem adequate to

200

The rules surrounding joinder of parties vary among the states. Rule 20 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, used as a model in some states, permits joinder of persons as
defendants "if there is asserted against them ... any right to relief" FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a).
Rule 19, which deals with mandatory joinder, requires joinder when a person claiming an
interest is so situated that adjudicating a claim in the person's absence would "as a practical
matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest or []leave any of the
persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or
otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest." FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a).
The language of that provision might be broad enough to cover neighbors in a zoning or
other land use dispute, but such a broad reading would require joinder in every dispute,
generating significant costs even when neighbors would have little interest in participating.
See Kramer, supra note 187, at 337-38 ("There will almost certainly be third parties who do
not care enough about the adverse effects of a consent decree to initiate litigation but who
will litigate once they have been made parties to an ongoing lawsuit. There is no reason to
encourage such litigation.").
201
For comparison purposes, Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits
intervention to any person who "claims an interest relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the
action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that
interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties." FED.
R. Clv. P. 24(a). Dean Kramer has noted that parties subject to the collateral attack bar
associated with consent decrees have had little difficulty satisfying Rule 24's requirements.
Kramer, supra note 187, at 339-41.
202
As the Supreme Court said in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co ., 339
U.S. 306 (1950): "An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections." Id. at 314; see also Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220,
234 (2006) (requiring adequate notice of tax sale of landowner's property); Mennonite Bd.
of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798 (1983) ("Since a mortgagee clearly has a legally
protected property interest, he is entitled to notice reasonably calculated to apprise him of a
pending tax sale.").
203
For instance, community and environmental groups sometimes have standing to
challenge zoning or environmental regulations. See, e.g., Save the Pine Bush, lnc. v.
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provide personal notice to all parties entitled, by statute, to notice of the zoning
actions necessary to implement the settlement, and to provide notice by
publication to the rest of the municipality. 204
A developer who had no intention of settling would not be required to
provide notice to neighbors or to trigger intervention rights. As a result,
neighbors would not have to incur the costs associated with intervention except
in those cases where the developer has signaled a willingness to settle, and
where the neighbors fear that the municipality will not adequately reflect their
interests in settlement negotiations.
Of course, this intervention approach entails collective action problems. 205
No individual neighbor may find it worth her while to intervene in legal
proceedings, and free rider problems may prevent organized intervention by
neighbors. Ultimately, however, this problem seems less serious because
precisely the same collective action problems exist when neighbors try to
challenge a settlement in a collateral proceeding - the only right they would
lose by failing to intervene. If neighbors would be unable to overcome those
collective action problems to intervene when settlement is proposed, they
would probably be equally unable to overcome them by challenging the
settlement in a collateral proceeding.
Another objection to the intervention approach focuses on timing: when
should neighbors be required to intervene in order to preserve a right to object
to any settlement? Requiring intervention as soon as the developer challenges
municipal action requires an expenditure by neighbors at a time when they
have reason to believe municipal officials adequately represent their
interests. 206 On the other hand, permitting the neighbors to intervene after they
learn of the settlement reduces somewhat the incentive of the developer and
the municipality to settle, because the investment in settlement will be for

Common Council of Albany, 918 N.E.2d 917, 918 (N.Y. 2009). It would be practically
impossible for a developer to provide notice to every potential environmental or community
group with standing to challenge a development proposal.
204
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-62.l (West 2008). In other jurisdictions, by
contrast, publication is the only notice required for land use changes. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T
CODE § 65090 (West 2010). In those jurisdictions where law requires neighbors to be alert
to publication, the same notices should suffice for intervention purposes.
205 See Weisburst, supra note 190, at 65-66.
206
See St. Charles Tower, Inc. v. County of Franklin, No. 4:09CV987-DJS, 2010 U.S.
Dist LEXIS 16948, at *15-16 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 25, 2010) (upholding right to intervene at the
time settlement is reached, stating that intervenors had no right to intervene "while the
County and BZA continued to adequately represent their interests").
Connecticut has a process for judicial approval of settlements (essentially the consent
decree approach), but the Connecticut courts have held that neighbors have a right to
intervene during the approval process. See Diamond 67, LLC v. Planning & Zoning
Comm'n of Vernon, 978 A.2d 122, 129-30 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009); see also Kramer, supra
note 187, at 342 (suggesting that time limitation on intervention should not run until a third
party "knew or should have known that his interests were threatened").
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naught if neighbors object at the eleventh hour. 207 On balance, a rule requiring
the neighbors to protect their interest by relatively "quiet" intervention participation as a nominal party - would not seem unduly burdensome. 208
Either alternative, however, avoids the delays the developer endures under
prevailing doctrine in many jurisdictions - delays attendant to collateral
litigation brought by neighbors after final resolution of the dispute between the
municipality and the developer.
The intervention approach does not eliminate disincentives to settlement. If
the neighbors intervene, and are sufficiently obstinate, they can effectively
force the municipality and the developer to litigate to final judgment, perhaps
even to appellate courts. Faced with that prospect, the developer and the
municipality would have reasons to forego an investment of resources in
settlement negotiations. But in many cases, neighbors will not intervene,
clearing a path for developers and the municipality to negotiate a settlement.
Even when neighbors do intervene, the chances for settlement are not
necessarily smaller than a doctrinal framework that does not provide for
intervention, but leaves any settlement open to neighbor challenge. In the
current no-intervention framework, reaching an agreement with the
municipality may be easier than in a regime that permits intervention, but the
settlement will be of less value to the developer because of the prospect that
neighbors will delay the project by bringing collateral litigation challenging the
settlement. An intervention regime would eliminate the costs and delays
associated with collateral litigation.
Making mediation available to the parties might further increase the
likelihood of settlement. Multi-party mediation of public policy issues has
become more common in recent years. 209 Once neighbors have decided to
intervene in a proceeding brought by the developer, they have little to lose by
seeking mediation of the dispute; any mediated settlement will require their

207

See T.H. Props., L.P. v. Upper Salford Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 970 A.2d 495, 500
(Pa. Cornmw. Ct. 2009) (holding that intervention had come too late because intervenor "or
other interested residents could have petitioned to intervene when the land use appeal was
filed or when the Board authorized settlement negotiations").
208
Professor Kramer has suggested that measuring the timeliness of a motion to
intervene from a starting point before the consent decree is entered would violate due
process. Kramer, supra note 187, at 344. That argument, however, is problematic in the
land use context. Certainly, state law would be free to deny standing to neighbors to
challenge municipal decisions to approve development projects, concluding that municipal
officials adequately represent neighbor interests. In light of that possibility, it is hard to see
how the state could violate due process by embracing a more limited rule giving those
neighbors standing, but requiring them to assert any rights as soon as litigation between the
developer and the municipality commences.
209
See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The lawyer as Consensus Builder: Ethics for a New
Practice, 70 TENN. L. REv. 63, 73 (2002); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Litigation Is Not
the Only Way: Consensus Building and Mediation as Public Interest Lawyering, 10 WASH.
U. J.L. & PoL'Y 37, 52-53 (2002).
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consent, 210 and they may be able to negotiate a settlement that leaves them
better off than the likely result of litigation. The prospect of a mediated and
binding settlement, avoiding the prospect of collateral litigation, will, in turn,
make negotiation and mediation more attractive to the developer. 211
Implementing an intervention-based system would, in most jurisdictions,
require legislative action. The scope of any legislation, however, would vary
depending on current law within the jurisdiction. At a minimum, however,
legislation would have to provide explicitly that failure to intervene would
preclude parties from collaterally attacking settlement of a litigation in which
the party could have intervened - a change from existing preclusion law in
most jurisdictions.
Explicit language overriding public hearing or
environmental review requirements might also be necessary or desirable. This
approach appears to provide the best alternative for promoting settlement
without risking other significant land use values.
CONCLUSION

In most jurisdictions, current doctrine limits the power of a municipality to
settle land use disputes without attaching conditions that reduce the value of
settlement to developers. As a result, more land use litigation proceeds to
judgment than would be the case in a regime that permitted free settlement.
Although the prevailing regime would appear inefficient in a world without
agency costs, the structure of land use law generally recognizes that agency
costs are a matter of significant concern. Some models of land use law fear
that municipal officials will be captured by dominant interest groups, and value
litigation as a check on capture. Within these models, giving municipal
officials -unconstrained power to settle litigation will not significantly
undermine the value of litigation as a check on official behavior. Within the
mediation model of land use regulation, a model that treats municipal officials
as mediators in disputes between developers and neighbors, unconstrained
settlement presents information and legitimacy problems, because settlement
threatens to leave one relevant interest group - and the information it might
bring to the table - out of the settlement process.
Even though some constraints on settlement of land use disputes may be
necessary in light of information and legitimacy concerns, there is little reason

210

See Goldfien, supra note 159, at 449 (commenting that one of the advantages of
mediation is that parties can discuss issues in the absence of "the imminent threat of an
adverse decision hanging over the proceedings").
211 Another alternative, a close cousin to mediation, is a "consensus building" approach.
Rather than insisting that all parties agree on each aspect of a proposal, the consensus
building approach first has the parties agree to abide by a near-unanimity rule. With such an
approach, all parties have an incentive to compromise to obtain the requisite consensus,
without fear that a single holdout will block consensus. See Lawrence Susskind,
Deliberative Democracy and Dispute Resolution, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 395, 40102 (2009).
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to assume that the set of constraints imposed by current doctrine are optimal.
In particular, information and legitimacy concerns would best be addressed by
requiring parties who might object to a settlement to intervene in the litigation
between developer and municipality rather than retaining the right to challenge
any settlement in collateral litigation.

